Subject: Arakan at the Crossroads: Addressing Newly-Emerging Military and Political Dynamics

In this commentary, Naing Lin analyses the latest state of conflict, how the political narrative has changed, the dangers of communal separation, the
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During recent months, resistance forces have made unprecedented advances against the military State Administration Council. A key front is Rakhine State where the Arakan Army now controls a majority of townships. But with the SAC in retreat, the Myanmar military is behaving with brutality and desperation, including the conscription of Rohingya Muslims in a bid to cause communal division. Meanwhile loss of life, displacement and humanitarian emergency are deepening. In this commentary, Naing Lin analyses the latest state of conflict, how the political narrative has changed, the dangers of communal separation, the scale of humanitarian suffering, and need for peace for all peoples in the struggle for Arakan freedom.

These commentaries are intended to contribute to a broader understanding of the many challenges facing the country and its peoples.

See the complete list of all the Myanmar commentaries.


Arakan at the Crossroads

Addressing Newly-Emerging Military and Political Dynamics

A Myanmar Commentary by Naing Lin

Arakan Army soldiers and Rohingya IDPs | Photo credit: AA Info Desk

Six months after ‘Operation 1027’ by the ‘Three Brotherhood Alliance’ (3BHAs) in northern Shan State, many observers have remarked that the military and political landscape in Myanmar has entered a new stage in momentum. Before this operation started on 27 October 2023, which was conducted in collaboration with several pro-democracy resistance groups, two key military and political narratives had dominated Myanmar politics. The first started with the assumption that military competition in the country was largely at a stalemate in which the State Administration Council (SAC) regime largely controlled urban and strategic communication centres, whereas opposition groups had reached their highest peak in operational movement from which they were bound to gradually decline. Second, and related to this, it was thought that the SAC-led Myanmar military could not be defeated in political terms, and thus returning to political dialogue and an electoral path under the highly unpopular 2008 constitution is the only alternative way to move the country and its population forward.


These military and political claims, however, have been broken down by Operation 1027 in which three ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) led the attack in northern Shan State: the Kokang Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA). An important role has also been played by another EAO, and 3BHA ally, in reconfiguring the landscape in the northeast of the country, the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO), whose main base is in Kachin State. The cumulative impact of these operations has been to produce an outstanding and unprecedented military outcome in which at least 15 towns were captured by the 3BHAs and their allies in northern Shan State until the intervention of a Beijing-initiated ceasefire on 11 January 2024.


Meanwhile resistance forces also launched military offensives on other ethnic nationality fronts – notably in Chin, Kayah (Karenni), Karen and southern Shan States – that resulted in significant advances for opposition movements. As a result, SAC control has much declined in non-Bamar territories around all Myanmar’s borders. At the same time, new anti-regime People’s Defence Forces, many of which support the opposition National Unity Government, have continued military operations in ethnic Bamar-majority areas, including Sagaing, Mandalay and Magway Regions. The military SAC, which seized power in a 2021 coup, is today widely rejected by peoples and communities across the country.


Against this backdrop, a critical military landscape has been developing in the western part of Myanmar in Arakan (Rakhine state) and adjoining territories in Chin State where the ULA/AA, a member of the 3BHAs, launched an offensive campaign on 13 November two weeks after the initiation of Operation 1027. Half a year later, the current cycle of armed conflict has witnessed a series of unprecedented military victories for the AA in its homeland base. In consequence, the ULA/AA is today the de facto administration in much of Rakhine State and the tri-border region with Bangladesh and India. Nevertheless many questions remain about how military and political contestation will unfold in western Myanmar in the near and long-term future.


This commentary is an effort to reflect the changing military and political dynamics in Arakan during a time of rapid and unparalleled change. During the past six months, a host of grave challenges have come to the fore. Urgent questions include the spread of armed conflict to every township in Rakhine State and adjoining territories, displacement among peoples of all nationalities, threats to social cohesion stemming from the SAC’s military attempts to recruit Rohingya youths, egregious human rights violations and worsening humanitarian emergency, and deepening speculation about future political scenarios for Arakan and its long-suffering peoples. Seven decades after independence from Great Britain, the struggle for freedom in Arakan has reached a critical crossroads.


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