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As conflict and suffering continue, the military State Administration Council is trying to use the tactics of ‘divide and rule’ to undermine countrywide resistance. But analysing experiences in Rakhine State, Naing Lin explains in this commentary why such stratagems are unlikely to work, whether splitting opposition movements or instigating inter-community conflict. Rather, the failures of the past are being repeated, while the United League of Arakan continues to build influence across the territory.
These commentaries are intended to contribute to a broader understanding of the many challenges facing the country and its peoples.
See the complete list of all the Myanmar commentaries.
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A New Dimension to Armed Conflicts in Arakan?
Core Tactics of Myanmar Military’s ‘Divide and Contain’ Strategy
A Myanmar Commentary by Naing Lin
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Myanmar border guard police by frontier fence, Maungdaw township / Credit: Border News Agency
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Myanmar is currently in a state of political and economic emergency. More than two and half years after the 2021 coup, the military government (officially known as the State Administration Council [SAC]) has been unable to restore peace and stability in the country amidst a continuing – and still rising – resistance movement in support of pro-federal democracy. The situation is quite different to the national breakdown that followed the previous military coup in September 1988. After passing through ten years of quasi-democratic liberalisation (2011-2020), many aspects of Myanmar politics and society have changed. The degree of change may vary in different parts of the country. But important dynamics in supporting change include exposure to democratic procedures and practices, enlargement of space by civil society actors, the spread of digital and communication technology, urbanisation and industrialization, and the improvement in material well-being in non-conflict areas of the country during ceasefires in the 2011-20 period.
All these phenomena helped prepare the ground for a more open and pluralistic future. Critically, they also combined with the emergence of the new ‘Generation Z’ of young people who are more politically aware than their ‘88 generation’ predecessors. As a result, popular rejection of the SAC coup was immediate, bringing about a dramatically new paradigm shift in socio-political mobilization across the country. The impact also resonated in ethnic politics, with the existing movements – including armed groups, political parties and civil society organisations – deciding to receive and cooperate with new formations among the ethnic Bamar (Burman) majority and newly-mobilised youth in the towns. Within months, the social and political landscape was transformed, symbolised by the creation of the pro-democracy National Unity Government (NUG) as a rival to the military SAC. For this reason, the phenomenon of the post-coup resistance can be better described as ‘revolution’ rather than ‘rebellion’ since the former has broader socio-political characteristics instead of simply seeking to change the government or regime.
After decades in power, though, the Myanmar military has become a hard-dying entity as a self-serving institution. The ideology, identity and interests of the organisation, known as the Tatmadaw or Sit-Tat, are highly integrated into what leaders call ‘national politics’ under the 2008 Constitution. Since the first military coup in 1962, the ruling generals have come to regard themselves as the sole liberators and guardians of the country, and they have been building up institutional capacity and dominance in many aspects of national life – including political processes, economic resources and social values – which are highly autonomous from other sectors of society. In consequence, the Myanmar military has become an increasingly isolated institution separated from the people, behaving more like a prerogative ‘state within a state’ or, equally divisive, ‘an army with a country’ rather than ‘a country with an army’.
To try and maintain this dominance, the Myanmar military has always identified itself as the permanent ‘protector’ and ‘promoter’ of the ‘(Burmese) race and (Buddhist) religion’. Over the years, this claim has drawn some forms of recognition and legitimacy from Myanmar nationalists and the broader population among the orthodox Buddhist Sangha and worshipper community. This protector role has also been promoted during times of conflict with non-Bamar or non-Buddhist groups, especially Chin, Kachin, Karen, Karenni and Rohingya. Since the coup, however, the very foundations of these claims to moral and nationalistic legitimacy have been wavering due to the escalation of new dimensions in conflict involving Bamar Buddhists in central and lowland areas of the country. This has witnessed the burning of villages and Buddhist temples by the Myanmar military as well as the killing of Buddhist monks and Bamar civilians, amplifying grievance across all communities and sectors of society.
As repression and suffering continue, the conclusions are clear. Since the coup, the key political trends in national politics have revealed the true colours of the Myanmar armed forces as an institution that only protects and promotes the interests and power of the military itself – and any means necessary will be employed to achieve this. In political science definitions, this is called the ‘patrimonialization of the state’ in which the agent itself becomes the sole principle for its own interests at the expense of the broader public ones. As a result, the tactics used by the Myanmar military to remain in power have become a central crisis facing the country, and once again they are being deployed to hold back peace and national reconciliation which the people have long desired.
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