| | | | | NCAT Legal Bulletin Issue 2 of 2020
|
| The NCAT Legal Bulletin provides a summary of relevant and interesting case law of significance to the work of the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal.
The latest issue feature case summaries of recent decisions from the Supreme Court of New South Wales, Court of Appeal of Victoria, and the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, including: - The Owners Strata Plan No 2245 v Veney [2020] NSWSC 134 - relating to the proper construction of a special by-law providing exclusive use to a lot owner of part of the common property, and the meaning of "nuisance" in s 153(1)(a) of the Strata Schemes Management Act 2015 (NSW).
- DGS v Office of the Children’s Guardian [2020] NSWSC 127 - an appeal from decision in the Administrative and Equal Opportunity Division of NCAT, finding that the Tribunal erred by failing to take into account critical oral evidence given by the appellant at the hearing, taking into account an irrelevant consideration by according weight to a statement in a FACS report that FACS had “substantiated” a complaint of sexual abuse, and treating this statement as evidence that FACS considered the allegation established to the civil standard of proof.
- Vito Zepinic v Health Care Complaints Commission [2020] NSWSC 13 - in which the Supreme Court affirmed the Tribunal's statement of the correct approach to be adopted in considering an application for a reinstatement order under the National Law.
- Meringnage v Interstate Enterprises Pty Ltd & Ors [2020] VSCA 30 - in which the Court of Appeal in the Supreme Court of Victoria, in answering a question of law referred to it, held that VCAT is not a court of a State, and therefore lacks authority to adjudicate a complaint under the Equal Opportunity Act 2010 (Vic) where the Commonwealth is a party.
- Medical Board of Australia v Yu [2020] SACAT 3 - in which the President of SACAT, in answering a question of law referred to her, found that the Medial Board of Australia (which also exists under NSW legislation and appears in the Occupational Division of NCAT) is not a State, and so SACAT is not prevented by s 75(iv) of the Constitution from determining disputes in which the Board is a party.
In addition, it contains links to recent bulletins published separately by the Court of Appeal, providing summaries of the following cases: - Police Association of NSW v State of NSW [2020] NSWCA 3
- Crown Resorts Limited v Zantran Pty Limited [2020] FCAFC 1
- Randren House Pty Ltd v Water Administration Ministerial Corporation [2020] NSWCA 14
- Duffy Kennedy Pty Ltd v Galileo Miranda Nominee Pty Ltd [2020] NSWCA 25
- Von Schoeler v Allen Taylor and Company Ltd Trading as Boral Timber (No 2) [2020] FCAFC 13
|
| |
Supreme Court of New South Wales
|
| The Owners Strata Plan No 2245 v Veney [2020] NSWSC 134
27 February 2020 - Darke J
In sum: The Supreme Court dismissed a summons filed by the plaintiff owners corporation seeking declaratory relief in relation to the construction of a special by-law, and injunctive relief to prevent the defendant, Mr Veney, from parking any motor vehicle in Lot 51 in the strata scheme ([1]).
Facts: The strata scheme in this dispute is made up of 100 lots – Lots 1-50 being residential lots, and Lots 51-100 being used as car parking spaces. Mr Veney is the owner of residential Lot 33 and parking Lot 51, which he acquired in 2006 ([2]-[3], [6]).
However, the dimensions and location of some of the parking lots, including Lot 51, have presented ongoing difficulties for their use. Lot 51 is located next to a rockery, and beside a number of other parking lots to which access becomes partly obstructed when Lot 51 is occupied by a car ([5]).
In 1998, the owners corporation passed a resolution in accordance with s 52 of the Strata Schemes Management Act 1996 (NSW) (SSMA 1996) to make Special By-Law 4. This provided that the owner of Lot 51 “shall be entitled to exclusive use and enjoyment” of a specified area of common property “for the purpose of parking a car thereon”, subject to a number of conditions. These required the owner, amongst other things, to properly maintain and repair the common property car space, and to indemnify the owners corporation against the costs that might arise from the use of that space ([5]).
In August 2019, the owners corporation applied to the Supreme Court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on the following bases:
- That Special By-Law 4 should be construed so that the right of exclusive use of the common property car space is given to the owner of Lot 51 in substitution for the right to use Lot 51 as a parking space ([7]).
- That, accordingly, Mr Veney has no right to use his Lot 51 as a parking space ([7]).
- In the alternative, that, by parking his car in Lot 51, Mr Veney commits an actionable nuisance contravening s 153(1)(a) of the Strata Schemes Management Act 2015 (NSW) (SSMA 2015) ([8]-[9]).
Held (dismissing the summons):
Whether surrounding circumstances to be taken into account in construction of Special By-Law 4
(i) Based on the principles set out by McColl JA in The Owners of Strata Plan No 3397 v Tate (2007) 70 NSWLR 344; [2007] NSWCA 207 (Tate), relating to the characterisation and interpretation of by-laws, Darke J noted (at [32]):
“[I]n ascertaining the meaning of Special By-Law 4, it is necessary to consider the language of the by-law, viewed in the statutory context in which it was made; and whilst recourse to surrounding circumstances may be permissible as an aid to construction it is necessary, particularly bearing in mind the public purpose of strata scheme by-laws, to exercise caution in going beyond the language of the by-law itself and its statutory context.”
(ii) The owners corporation submitted that the Court should take into account the following “surrounding circumstances” in interpreting By-Law 4 ([33]-[34]):
- the historical evidence that previous owners of Lot 33 did not park in Lot 51;
- the physical characteristics of the land at the time Special By-Law 4 was made; and
- the contents of a letter, before the by-law was made, from the strata managing agent requesting advice from a solicitor on whether the owners corporation could grant exclusive access of the “common property car space” to the owners of Lot 33, subject to there being no use of “the spot on the strata plan” (i.e. Lot 51).
(iii) Darke J found that, in accordance with the cautionary approach in Tate, recourse should not be had to either the historical evidence or the agent’s letter as surrounding circumstances on the question of construction. Those materials were not available to third persons (including Mr Veney), and were in any event open to various interpretations ([37]).
(iv) Further, Darke J did not consider that the physical characteristics of the site at the time the by-law was made should be considered a useful aid to construction. In the absence of evidence of what material was before the meeting when the by-law was made, it could not be assumed that any particular physical characteristics were considered as relevant ([37]).
(v) In his Honour’s opinion, Special By-Law 4 was to be interpreted by reference to its language, understood in the statutory context in which it was made ([38]).
Language and statutory context of Special By-Law 4
(vi) Special By-Law 4 was made pursuant to Division 4 of Chapter 2 of the SSMA 1996, as it conferred on a lot owner a right of exclusive use and enjoyment of a part of the common property (see s 51(1)(a)). As permitted by s 53 of that Act, the right of exclusive use and enjoyment was conferred subject to a number of specified conditions ([38]).
(vii) The terms of Special By-Law 4 do not explicitly state that the right of exclusive use and enjoyment is conferred either in addition to, or in substitution for, the rights the owner of Lot 51 has apart from the by-law ([39]).
(viii) The ordinary and natural meaning of the words in Special By-Law 4 is that a new right is conferred on the owner of Lot 51, however, there is nothing to affirmatively suggest that the existence of any other right held by that owner is to be removed, reduced, or restricted in any way. While it would have been open to the owners corporation to include a condition to this effect, none of the conditions specified are concerned with the existence or exercise of any rights in relation to the use of Lot 51. If Special By-Law 4 was intended to cut down the property rights of the owner of Lot 51, it would be expected that words clearly showing that intention would be included. Words to that effect should not be read into the by-law ([40]-[41]).
(ix) Darke J found he was unable to accept the construction contended for by the owners corporation. The language of Special By-Law 4, read in its statutory context, would convey to a reasonable person that a new right was being conferred upon the owner of Lot 51 subject only to the specified conditions, and that the rights of that owner which exist apart from the by-law continue unabated ([42]).
(x) The owners corporation’s claim for declaratory relief as to the construction of Special By-Law 4 was rejected ([43]).
Nuisance; meaning of “nuisance” in SSMA 2015
(xi) Darke J accepted the owners corporation’s submission that, where “nuisance” is not defined for the purpose of s 153(1)(a) of the SSMA 2015, that section should be interpreted in accordance with the common law meaning of an actionable nuisance. This is consistent with the approach taken in NCAT – for example, in Cannell v Barton [2014] NSWCATCD 103 at [95] and Gisks v The Owners – Strata Plan No 6743 [2019] NSWCATCD 44 at [26] ([46]-[47]).
(xii) In broad terms, an actionable nuisance may be described as an unlawful interference with a person’s use or enjoyment of land, or of some right over or in connection with the land. Liability is founded upon a state of affairs created, adopted or continued by a person, otherwise than in the reasonable and convenient use of their own land, which, to a substantial degree, harms another owner or occupier of land in the enjoyment of that person’s land: Hargrave v Goldman (1963) 110 CLR 40 at 59-62 ([45]).
(xiii) Given the limited evidence adduced by the parties, Darke J noted it was “difficult to ascertain with precision the extent to which parking on Lot 51 interferes with the occupiers of other lots in the use and enjoyment of their parking lots” ([50]).
(xiv) However, his Honour accepted the evidence given by another lot owner that, when Lot 51 is occupied by a car, it takes “multiple manoeuvres” for a vehicle to enter or exit the neighbouring garages. That witness described that exercise as “doable” but “tight” ([53]).
(xv) In light of this, Darke J found he was unable to accept that, when a vehicle is parked in Lot 51, entry to and exit from the garages directly across the aisle is “completely blocked” ([54]).
(xvi) Although his Honour accepted that the presence of a vehicle in Lot 51 reduces the area that can be used for manoeuvring into surrounding garages, he noted Lot 51 is “not truly an area available for that purpose”. Rather, “[i]t is the property of Mr Veney, not part of the common property”. Therefore, to the extent that parking on Lot 51 prevents or impedes its use for the manoeuvring of other cars, her Honour “[did] not think it [could] be said to be a substantial interference with another owner or occupier in the enjoyment of that person’s land or of some right over or in connection with it” ([55]).
(xvii) It was also relevant to consider the effect of the rockery in contributing to the difficulties experienced in exiting and entering the nearby garages. Given that lot owners are entitled to use the common property to gain reasonable access to their lots, but have no right to use Lot 51 for that purpose, Darke J found it was fair to regard the presence of the rockery and the other gardens on common property as the true impediment to the enjoyment of the rights of the other lot owners ([56]-[61]).
(xviii) Further, his Honour considered that use of Lot 51 for parking a vehicle is a reasonable use of the land in all the circumstances. Lot 51 is a small area only suitable for parking, or perhaps for storage (which would create the same problem). The fact that Mr Veney has the benefit of the right conferred by Special By-Law 4 to use another car space does not lead to the conclusion that parking on Lot 51 is not a reasonable use of the lot. Properly construed, Special By-Law 4 does not cut down the property rights of the owner of Lot 51 ([62]).
(xix) On the totality of the evidence, Darke J was not satisfied that the exercise by Mr Veney of his right to park a vehicle upon lot 51 amounted to an actionable nuisance against any other occupier of a lot in the strata scheme ([60], [63]).
Read the decision on the NSW Caselaw website.
|
| DGS v Office of the Children’s Guardian [2020] NSWSC 127
26 February 2020 - Fullerton J
In sum: The Supreme Court allowed an appeal from the Administrative and Equal Opportunity Division of NCAT affirming a decision of the Office of the Children’s Guardian refusing to grant the appellant a Working With Children Check (WWCC) clearance. Fullerton J set aside the Tribunal’s first instance decision, available here, and remitted the matter for determination by a differently constituted Tribunal.
Facts: In December 2016, the appellant applied to the Office of the Children’s Guardian for a WWCC clearance under s 13 of the Child Protection (Working with Children) Act 2012 (NSW) (CPWC Act). It was a requirement of the appellant’s continued full-time employment as a Course Information Coordinator at TAFE NSW that he hold such a clearance ([33]).
The appellant was subject to a risk assessment under the CPWC Act because of criminal charges that were laid against him in 2013 and prosecuted in 2015 ([34]). In brief, the charges related to the alleged sexual assault of the appellant’s daughter, which came to the attention of FACS after the child allegedly disclosed an instance of inappropriate touching to her grandmother ([29]). The appellant was acquitted in October 2015 ([29]).
The sexual assault allegations were also raised in July 2016 in the course of a custody dispute in the Family Court, which resulted in consent orders for custody and access being made between the appellant and his wife ([30]).
After requesting and considering further information in support of his application for a WWCC clearance (including letters from the appellant’s wife and his employer), the Children’s Guardian informed the appellant that she had refused to grant him a clearance, being satisfied that he posed a risk to the safety of children, as provided for in s 18(2) of the CPWC Act ([35]-[39]).
The appellant sought administrative review of this decision in NCAT in 2018, where his application was heard by a Senior and General Member. While the General Member was of the opinion that the decision of the Children’s Guardian should be overturned, the Senior Member disagreed, finding the “correct and preferable decision” was that the appellant did “pose a risk to the safety of children” and “should not have a [WWCC] clearance”. In accordance with s 57 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) (NCAT Act), the presiding member’s decision was taken to be the decision of the Tribunal, and therefore the decision of the Children’s Guardian was affirmed. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court, pursuant to Sch 3, cl 17(a) of the NCAT Act ([3]-[5]).
Held (allowing the appeal):
Whether the Tribunal erred in disregarding critical information supplied by the appellant during his oral evidence, contrary to the mandatory obligation imposed by s 30(1)(j) of the CPWC Act
(i) The Senior Member appeared to partly “import” the submissions of the Children’s Guardian into the reasons for his decision. These were submissions filed before the hearing, and therefore before the appellant had given evidence. Importantly, they included a submission that the appellant had not addressed either (1) “boundary violations” involving the appellant bathing naked with his daughter when she was three or four years old, or (2) “issues of domestic violence” in the appellant’s family home, and the impact these had on their children. These were issues which a psychologist, Dr Lennings, had identified in an expert report tendered in the Family Court proceedings, and which the Senior Member accepted “show[ed] that the [appellant] pose[d] a risk to the safety of children”. Dr Lennings was not required for cross-examination either in the Family Court or before the Tribunal ([11], [74], [82]-[84]).
(ii) By accepting the respondent’s submissions without qualification, the Senior Member failed to aver to evidence given by the appellant in cross-examination, where he was asked to address the two issues identified by Dr Lennings. In his oral evidence, the appellant “confirmed that he had gained insight concerning appropriate boundaries…. and confirmed the steps he had taken…. to address any risk of repetition of the conflict with his wife” ([80]-[81], [92]).
(iii) This constituted a clear failure by the Senior Member to take into account a critical aspect of the plaintiff’s evidence, particularly given that, by the time of the Tribunal hearing, the appellant’s children were both above the age where they would be bathed by either parent, and the “boundary violation” to which the Senior Member gave significant weight had been identified by Dr Lennings “years earlier” ([94]).
(iv) This error may have been avoided if the Senior Member had made an assessment of the appellant’s credibility and reliability, however, he did not undertake that exercise ([94]).
(v) It was no answer to this error of law that the Senior Member noted he had read the dissenting reasons of the General Member, which included a reference to the appellant’s evidence under cross-examination and her finding that he was a credible and reliable witness, given the Senior Member said expressly that the General Member’s reasons had not caused him to alter his views ([93]).
(vi) Fullerton J distinguished these circumstances from those in CPD v Office of the Children’s Guardian [2019] NSWSC 8, where McCallum J dismissed a similar ground of appeal asserting that the Tribunal failed to consider the plaintiff’s oral evidence in breach of the mandatory obligation in s 30(1)(j) of the CPWC Act. The central issue before the Tribunal then was whether it could make a positive finding that CPD had engaged in the impugned conduct, despite being acquitted, by undertaking an analysis of the evidence presented at his trial. CPD’s oral evidence before the Tribunal did not go beyond his sworn evidence in the criminal trial, to which the Tribunal’s reasons expressly referred ([95]).
(vii) By contrast, in this matter, the Children’s Guardian did not invite the Tribunal to find that the appellant “had probably abused his daughter”, but rather to leave that question open, and conclude that, because of “boundary violations” (not necessarily amounting to abuse) and instances of domestic violence in the family home, the appellant continued to pose a risk to the safety of children ([96]).
(viii) Failing to consider the appellant’s detailed evidence on these issues, and to make any assessment of the appellant’s credibility or reliability in light of that evidence, was an error of law ([96]).
Whether the Tribunal took into account an irrelevant consideration by according weight to a statement in a FACS report that FACS had “substantiated” the complaint of sexual abuse
(ix) The Senior Member also made extensive reference to findings contained in a FACS report created in July 2013. The FACS report was not signed, nor was the assessor identified, other than as a person within the “business process” of the Parramatta Joint Investigation Response Team (JIRT) which interviewed the child following the initial complaint of sexual abuse ([20], [100]-[104]).
(x) In particular, the Senior Member treated as significant the use of the word “substantiated” in the FACS report, where the “risk of harm to the child” and “actual harm” were both noted as having “been substantiated”, and the “harm type… identified as sexual abuse” ([104]).
(xi) Fullerton J found that this was an “irrelevant consideration in the risk assessment [the Tribunal] was obliged to make” ([98], [116]).
(xii) Precisely what the Senior Member meant when utilising the concept of a “substantiated allegation” was not clear. Further, although he treated the “substantiated allegations” as evidence that FACS treated the allegations as “established to the civil standard of proof” (a finding which he regarded as “persuasive evidence of the existence of risk”) he did clarify the basis upon which he took that approach, nor did he seek submissions from the parties as to whether that was an approach open to him as a matter of law ([101]-[102]).
(xiii) The appellant relied on Re Benji and Perry [2018] NSWSC 1750 (Re Benji). In that case, the Secretary of FACS sought to establish that there was a risk to the safety of two children, Benji and Perry, by relying on a decision by a FACS officer that the allegations of a third child that she had been abused by the same people were “substantiated” ([109]).
(xiv) Although the circumstances in Re Benji differed from those of the current appeal, Fullerton J saw no reason to treat the FACS risk assessment report in these proceedings any differently, namely ([114]):
- as a value judgement made at a particular point in time;
- by a person, based on the information available to that person;
- which not does not bind any subsequent fact finder; and
- where the probative value of the fact that an allegation of abuse was “substantiated” diminishes where there is no evidence of:
(a) the expertise of the person undertaking that assessment, or
(b) the standard of proof that was employed in that process.
(xv) Fullerton J was satisfied that the Tribunal erred in treating the author of the FACS report’s description of a “substantiated allegation” as evidence that FACS had considered the allegation established to the civil standard of proof. There was nothing in the legislation under which that report was prepared which permitted the Senior Member to take that approach ([115]).
(xvi) This was not to say that the FACS report should not have been tendered in the Tribunal proceedings. However, at its highest, the report should have been treated as “nothing more than an indication that the author of the report, upon his or her review of the available material as at 16 July 2013, had formed the view that there was a reasonable basis for suspecting that the child was at risk of significant harm because of the risk of sexual abuse being present ‘to a significant degree’” ([116]).
(xvii) More broadly, in Fullerton J’s view, “a report prepared under the Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 (NSW) in accordance with the specific statutory objects in that Act cannot equate with a finding of fact that the allegation of sexual abuse has been established to the civil standard of proof in review proceedings” ([116]).
(xviii) In this case, despite the fact that the Tribunal limited its reliance on the “substantiated allegations” as “persuasive evidence of the existence of risk”, as distinct from supporting a finding that the abuse actually occurred, it took into account an irrelevant consideration by treating the “substantiated allegations” as evidence, established to the civil standard of proof, which “tip[ped] the balance” against a finding favourable to the appellant ([101], [116]).
(xix) Further grounds of appeal put forward by the appellant were either not made out, or were deemed irrelevant for Fullerton J to consider, given her Honour was satisfied that the appellant had demonstrated legal error on the above two grounds ([121]-[122], [127]-[130]).
Read the decision on the NSW Caselaw website.
|
| Vito Zepinic v Health Care Complaints Commission [2020] NSWSC 13
3 February 2020 - N Adams J
In sum: The Supreme Court dismissed an appeal from the Occupational Division of NCAT refusing to reinstate the appellant, Mr Zepinic, as a psychologist. That first instance decision is available here. The Health Care Complaints Commission (HCCC) appeared as contradictor in NCAT and was the respondent in the Supreme Court appeal.
Facts: Dr Zepinic emigrated to Australia in 1993, and applied for registration with the Psychologist’s Registration Board of New South Wales (the Board). He provided documentation concerning his qualifications in the former Yugoslavia and was registered as a psychologist in 1994. He worked as a psychologist in a number of positions both in Queensland and New South Wales after that time ([10]).
In 2008 the HCCC brought a prosecution against Dr Zepinic in the Local Court of NSW for breaches of s 105(1) of the Medical Practice Act 1992 (NSW) (now repealed). It was alleged that when Dr Zepinic prepared medico-legal reports he held out that he was a medical practitioner writing the initials “MBBS” after his name, despite never having been registered as a medical practitioner in Australia or the former Yugoslavia. When asked why he was referred to as “Dr Zepinic” in the material before the Supreme Court, he explained that he had a Doctor of Philosophy conferred in the former Yugoslavia ([11]-[12]).
Dr Zepenic was found guilty of these charges in the Local Court on 22 July 2008 ([13]).
In August 2010, the then Psychologists Tribunal of NSW issued a decision dealing with an application for review by Dr Zepenic of a decision by the Board that he had engaged in unsatisfactory professional conduct, an “inquiry” by the Board seeking that Dr Zepinic’s registration be cancelled, and two further complaints by the Board that Dr Zepenic was not of good character and had engaged in professional misconduct ([28]).
The Psychologists Tribunal found that the complaints were established, and made an order cancelling Dr Zepinic’s name from the register, a prohibition order and an exclusion order for a period of 5 years ([32]).
After the first directions hearing, Dr Zepinic had relocated to the United Kingdom, where he sought to practice as a psychologist, claimed he did not have any previous criminal convictions, and was subsequently convicted on three counts of fraud ([25], [33]-[34]).
In October 2016, Dr Zepinic returned to Australia and sought a reinstatement order to be registered as a psychologist in NSW again. Under the National Law (which came into effect in July 2010), the Psychology Board of Australia could not consider whether Dr Zepinic should be registered as a psychologist until NCAT granted him a reinstatement order under s 163B. The reinstatement application was heard in NCAT in July 2018, where the HCCC acted as contradictor ([27], [36]-[39]).
NCAT refused the reinstatement application and provided its reasons for doing so on 18 October 2018. In addition, NCAT ordered that there was to be no review of its order until 5 years after its date and that Dr Zepinic was to pay the HCCC’s costs ([43], [62]).
Dr Zepinic appealed to the Supreme Court against the whole of NCAT’s decision to refuse his reinstatement as a psychologist, pursuant to Sch 5, cl 29 of the NCAT Act ([1]-[2]).
Held (dismissing the appeal):
(i) As a preliminary issue, it was noted that although Dr Zepinic has been declared to be a vexatious litigant pursuant to s 8(7)(b) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (NSW), that declaration only concerns the commencement of specified proceedings and had no bearing on these proceedings: Zepinic v Château Constructions (Aust) Ltd; Château Constructions (Aust) Ltd v Zepinic [2017] NSWSC 582 and Vito Zepinic v Château Constructions (Aust) Limited; Nina Zepinic v Château Constructions (Aust) Limited [2018] NSWCA 317.
(ii) N Adams J was satisfied that none of Dr Zepinic’s grounds of appeal or subsequent submissions established any error of law or fact in NCAT’s decision not to reinstate him as a psychologist ([82]).
(iii) The focus of NCAT’s enquiry was a narrow one, limited to whether Dr Zepinic had demonstrated that in the future “he w[ould] act in accordance with the high standards and responsibilities of the profession” ([83]).
(iv) Her Honour noted that the relevant principles guiding an application for reinstatement were correctly stated in the decision of NCAT, extracting that statement as follows ([85]):
“[7] The approach to be adopted in considering an application for a reinstatement order under the National Law has been set out in several decisions of this Tribunal and the former Tribunals. In Haber v Health Care Complaints Commission [2018] NSWCATOD 16 the Tribunal stated the principles in the following terms:
12. We accept as correct the Commission’s submissions as to the relevant principles to be applied. These include:
- The Tribunal must have regard to the objectives and guiding principles of the National Law (see s 3). These include the objective of the protection of the public by ensuring that only health practitioners who are suitably trained and qualified to practise in a competent and ethical manner are registered (s 3(2)(a));
- The paramount consideration is the protection of the health and safety of the public: see s 3A;
- The onus lies on the applicant for reinstatement to demonstrate that he or she can be trusted to practise in a way that conforms to the professional standards expected of a health practitioner, and in particular in a manner that presents no risk to the safety of the public and their confidence in the profession: Ameisen v Medical Council of New South Wales [2015] NSWCATOD 49 at [24];
- The purpose of the jurisdiction is to protect the public, and is not for the punishment of the former practitioner: s 3A of the National Law; Re Mansoor Haider Zaidi [2006] NSWMT 6 at [42]: Reimers v Medical Council of NSW [2015] NSWCATOD 38 at [13].
- There is no public interest in denying forever the chance of redemption and rehabilitation to former practitioner[s]. On the contrary, the public is better served if, in appropriate cases, those who have offended, once they have affirmatively proved they are reformed, are afforded a second chance. Dawson v Law Society of NSW [1989] NSWCA 58; Coe v Health Care Complaints Commission [2013] NSWNMT 12 at [23].
- “Clear proof” is required to establish that there has been a reformation of character: Ex parte Tziniolis; Re Medical Practitioners’ Act (1966) 67 SR (NSW) 448 at 461. In this respect, the applicant is “in a more disadvantageous position than an original applicant. He or she must in effect displace the decision for deregistration that has been made”: Amieson at [24].
- It is not "a question of what an applicant has suffered in the past. It is a question of his [her] worthiness and his [her] reliability for the future". The decision in any particular case is to a greater or lesser extent dependent upon the Tribunal's assessment of the applicant: In Re Jason Martin [2010] NSWMT 13; Shah v Health Care Complaints Commission [2014] NSWCATOD 94 at [34];
8. In Ng v Health Care Complaints Commission [2018] NSWCATOD 105 the Tribunal stated:
30. In Re Mansoor Haider Zaidi [2006] NSWMT 6 (at [42]) the Medical Tribunal made the obvious point that:
[A]n applicant for reinstatement … is in a more disadvantageous position than an original applicant. He must displace the decision for deregistration which has been made. As a consequence, presumptions of fitness which might otherwise arise than from an absence of contrary suggestions can no longer advantage him, precisely because of the removal of his name from the Register on the basis of unfitness.
31. In that case, the Medical Tribunal also stated at [42]:
[T]he ultimate issue … is a question of [the applicant’s] worthiness and his reliability for the future. What in this respect the Tribunal must determine is whether it is satisfied that for the future the applicant will act in accordance with the high standards and responsibilities of the profession.”
(v) It was apparent throughout the hearing of the appeal in the Supreme Court that Dr Zepinic either could not or would not apprehend the statutory task that NCAT was undertaking when considering his reinstatement application. That is, either he genuinely could not understand the principles guiding the reinstatement application, or he did understand them and persisted in making submissions not relevant to the real issue before this court ([87]).
Read the decision on the NSW Caselaw website.
|
| Court of Appeal of Victoria
|
| Meringnage v Interstate Enterprises Pty Ltd & Ors [2020] VSCA 3025 February 2020 - Tate, Niall, Emerton JJA
In sum: The Victorian Court of Appeal (VSCA) answered three questions of law referred to it by the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT), pursuant to s 96 of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic) (VCAT Act):
- Is VCAT a “court of a State” within the meaning of Ch III of the Commonwealth Constitution (the Constitution), and so capable of exercising judicial power in relation to a matter in which the Commonwealth is a party?
- If not, would the grant of relief in this proceeding, pursuant to s 125 of the Equal Opportunity Act 2010 (Vic) (the EO Act), involve the exercise of judicial power by VCAT?
- In light of the answers to Questions 1 and 2, does VCAT have authority to decide the application against the Commonwealth?
The VSCA held that VCAT is not a “court of a State”; that VCAT would be exercising judicial power in making orders under s 125 of the EO Act; and that VCAT did not have authority to determine the proceedings because the presence of the Commonwealth as a party demands the exercise of federal judicial power, rendering the dispute a “matter” within the meaning of s 75(iii) of the Constitution ([144], [148]).
Facts: These questions arose from an application brought by Mr Meringnage in VCAT, alleging that he was discriminated against on the grounds of his race and nationality by Interstate Enterprises Pty Ltd (Interstate), a recruitment agency, on behalf of RUAG Australia Pty Ltd (RUAG), a company that provides services to the Australian Defence Force. Mr Meringnage applied for a job with RUAG, but was told he did not satisfy the security requirements set out in the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) because he is Sri Lankan. Sri Lanka is an ITAR “proscribed country”, meaning Sri Lankan nationals are prohibited from accessing ITAR controlled information, articles and services relating to international traffic in arms.
Mr Meringnage sought orders in VCAT against Interstate, RUAG and the Commonwealth under s 125 of the EO Act.
Held:
Is VCAT a “court of a state”? – NO
(i) The VSCA considered a number of authorities on the status of State tribunals, including the decision in Attorney-General for NSW v Gatsby (2018) 99 NSWLR 1; [2018] NSWCA 254 (Gatsby), in which the NSWCA cited a number of features of NCAT leading to the “clear conclusion” that it is not a State court ([76]-[77]).
(ii) The VSCA agreed with Weinberg J in Director of Housing v Sudi (2011) VR 559 and Perry J in Qantas Airways v Lustig (2015) 228 FCR 148 that an aggregation of the organisational features of VCAT similarly compels the conclusion that VCAT is not a State court ([80]).
(iii) The most significant of these factors is the lack of security of tenure for the overwhelming proportion of VCAT members – that is, the fixed-term nature of appointments, coupled with the potential for reappointment dependent on executive discretion. This is contrasted with the appointment until a set retirement age, with no diminution of remuneration, enjoyed by judges ([80]-[81]).
(iv) Fixed-term appointments, with the potential for reappointment, detract from the independence of VCAT as an institution, because there is a risk that reappointment may be based, or appear to be based, on whether the Minister approves of the member’s decision-making history. This comes with a corresponding risk that members will tailor their decisions to favour their chances of reappointment ([81]).
(v) This difficulty is exacerbated where many of the disputes that come before VCAT involve officers of the executive government, and where the overwhelming majority of VCAT members are appointed on fixed renewable terms. For the reappointment of a decision-maker to turn on an exercise of discretion by the executive government, when it is the decision-maker’s role to review decisions taken by that executive government, is fundamentally inconsistent with the guarantee of independence and impartiality that Ch III requires. The taking of an oath is not sufficient to cure that inconsistency ([82]-[83]).
(vi) The power of reappointment is more significant than the power of removal, as the latter is at least subject to some parliamentary scrutiny. In any case, the Minister could adjust the composition of VCAT by refusing to appoint certain members, without needing to rely on the removal power ([92]-[94]).
(vii) Although there is “no doubt” that the members of VCAT perform their roles conscientiously, the institutional arrangements of VCAT are not, and do not appear to be, constrained in a manner that provides a guarantee against external pressure by the executive government ([84]).
(viii) The VSCA disagreed with the observation by McMurdo P in Owen v Menzies [2012] QCA 170 that the proportion of judicial to non-judicial members in a decision-making body is irrelevant, where VCAT is an institution predominantly composed of non-judicial officers – that is, it is not a case that “stand[s] at the margins” ([86]).
(ix) It would also be wrong to use the security of tenure afforded to only a handful of VCAT members (the judicial officers) to support the proposition that the institution as a whole has a sufficient quality of independence. However, this does not mean that a court must be comprised solely of judges ([86]).
(x) The fact that many members are “sessional” (i.e. neither full-time nor part-time, but “available as required”) is also important, as this increases the likelihood that conflicts of interest may arise, especially where the constraints on part-time and sessional members in the VCAT Act stand “in sharp contrast” to those applicable to judicial officers ([44]-[45], [88]-[90]).
(xi) The fact that a number of VCAT members are not qualified lawyers is significant. At minimum, a court of law must be composed predominantly of people who are trained in the law ([91]).
(xii) The legislative designation of VCAT, though important, is not decisive ([95]).
(xiii) Section 96 itself, which founded this referral, would be a “curious provision” if VCAT was a State court. If that were the case, there would be no need for s 96(3), as VCAT would be bound by determinations of the Supreme Court in the ordinary way as part of the judicial hierarchy ([97]).
Does the VCAT proceeding involve the exercise of judicial power? – YES
(xiv) VCAT is empowered to make orders traditionally made in the exercise of judicial power. Parties at VCAT are “able to obtain a binding, authoritative and curially enforceable judgment independently of the consent of the person against whom [a] complaint [has] been brought”: Burns v Corbett (2017) 316 FLR 448; [2017] NSWCA 3 at [30] (Leeming JA, referring to NCAT’s exercise of judicial power).
(xv) In the VSCA’s view, “the range and character of the orders VCAT can make on a finding of a contravention of the EO Act, together with the unilateral enforceability of those orders in accordance with ordinary curial processes, confirms that VCAT is exercising judicial power in this proceeding” ([108]).
Does VCAT nevertheless have the authority to decide a suit against the Commonwealth? – NO
(xvi) Mr Meringnage submitted that, even if VCAT was not a “court of a State”, the proceeding was not a “matter” within s 75 (iii) of the Constitution, relying on the reasoning of Basten JA in Gatsby. The VSCA refers to this as “the Gatsby approach” ([110]-[114]).
(xvii) According to the VSCA, the Gatsby approach turns upon three propositions:
- That there is no authority that establishes that every form of dispute which might fall within ss 75 and 76 of the Constitution requires for its resolution the exercise of federal judicial power ([130]);
- That the choice by a legislature to confer the power to resolve a particular type of dispute on a tribunal, rather than a court, may result in the power being classified as an administrative, rather than a judicial power, even though the same power conferred on a court may be understood as having a judicial character. In other words, the character of the function or power may be taken to reflect the character of the institutional body in which it is vested (the so-called “chameleon” doctrine) ([134]);
- That, if a right, duty or liability is not enforceable in a court (because the State legislature has chosen to make it enforceable only in a tribunal), then ss 75 and 76 of the Constitution are not engaged. In other words, whether a dispute that otherwise falls within the categories in ss 75 and 76 is a “matter” in the constitutional sense is a function of legislative choice by a State as to the forum it decides is appropriate for resolution of the dispute ([116]-[117]; [136]-[139]).
(xviii) The first proposition has a “positive” and “negative” aspect. The positive aspect is tantamount to the “uncontroversial” proposition that disputes involving the same parties as those identified in ss 75 and 76 may sometimes be resolved through exercise of administrative, non-judicial power (e.g. the determination of taxation disputes or immigration applications in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal). The negative aspect is that only disputes requiring determination in a legal proceeding (i.e. by a court) must be resolved by federal judicial power. This assumes a dichotomy between “judicial power” and “non-curial institutions” such that institutions that are not courts cannot exercise judicial power. While true for federal institutions, this dichotomy does not apply to the States, where any identification between judicial power and curial institutions at the State level must be avoided ([131]-[133]).
(xix) The second proposition similarly has force in respect of functions conferred on federal tribunals, but has limited application to the States. The conferral by a State Parliament of an adjudicative function on an administrative tribunal cannot ground the inference that no exercise of judicial of power is involved, because the State Parliament is taken to understand that State tribunals can exercise judicial power, there being no strict separation of powers at the State level ([135], [143], [146]).
(xx) Acceptance of the third proposition would allow a State Parliament, “by a stroke of the legislative pen, to avoid all of the strictures that flow from the constitutional identification of certain subject-matters as comprising federal jurisdiction including the requirement that those matters are to be dealt with… only by State courts… that satisfy the minimum guarantee of impartiality and independence” ([140]).
(xxi) The third proposition would have force if State courts were the exclusive repositories of State judicial power, such that a failure to provide for the determination of a right, duty or liability in a State court might indicate that the Parliament considered it did not call for an exercise of judicial power. However, this is not the case ([142]).
(xxii) It is also inconsistent with Burns v Corbett (2018) 92 ALJR 423; [2018] HCA 15, where the High Court plurality emphasised that the Constitution does not permit a State Parliament to “sidestep its own courts… by investing an agency of its executive government with the adjudicative authority characteristic of the courts in respect of the matters listed in ss 75 and 76” ([118]-[121], [147]).
Read the decision on the Australasian Legal Information Institute (AustLII) website.
|
| South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal
|
| Medical Board of Australia v Yu [2020] SACAT 3
14 January 2020 - Hughes J
In sum: The President of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (SACAT), Hughes J, decided a Question of Law referred to her under s 26 of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA). The question was whether SACAT had jurisdiction to determine a complaint brought by the Medical Board of Australia (the Board) against Dr Yu for professional misconduct.
This depended on whether the matter was between “a State and a resident of another State” within the meaning of s 75(iv) of the Constitution, such that the decision would involve an exercise of federal diversity jurisdiction, and SACAT, not being a “court of a State”, could not determine the complaint. In turn, this depended on determining whether the Board constitutes a “State”.
The President held that the Board is not a State, and so SACAT had jurisdiction to determine the complaint.
Facts: The respondent, Dr Yu, was registered by the Board as a medical practitioner under the National Law, and worked in a medical centre in South Australia. In 2015, he was found to be in possession of child exploitation material, contrary to s 63A of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA), and in 2016 was convicted of that offence. In 2017, the Board referred Dr Yu’s professional misconduct to the South Australian Health Practitioners Tribunal (SAHPT). At this point in time, Dr Yu was a resident of Victoria. On 9 August 2019, the proceedings were transferred to SACAT pursuant to s 112(4) of the Statutes Amendment (SACAT) Act 2019 (SA) ([12], [15]).
Held (answering “yes” to the Question of Law):
(i) Neither party suggested that the proceedings were not a “matter” for the purposes of s 75(iv). The President proceeded on the basis that the nature of the proceedings brought them within the meaning of “matter”, observing that the term is intended to have very wide operation ([13]).
(ii) The issue was whether the Board should be characterised as a State that is not Victoria, such that the parties to the proceedings would be captured by s 75(iv) ([14]).
History of the National Law and the Board
(iii) The President outlined the history of the legislative scheme known in SACAT (and NCAT) as the National Law. In SACAT, the provisions of the National Law are now contained in Sch 2 to the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (South Australia) Act 2010 (SA) (the South Australian Act) ([16]).
(iv) In 2008, the Commonwealth and eight States and Territories entered into an Intergovernmental Agreement with the objective of establishing a single national registration and accreditation scheme for health professionals ([17]).
(v) The plan was for Queensland to be the “host jurisdiction”, and to take the lead in enacting the primary legislation to establish the scheme. The Queensland legislation set out the provisions of the National Law and provided for the creation of various organs of the national scheme – including the Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency and the Medical Board of Australia ([17], [22]).
(vi) When the South Australian Act commenced operation in July 2010, it applied the text of the Queensland legislation as a law of South Australia until August 2010, when further regulations were made incorporating the National Law into the South Australian Act. These were later amended in 2018 ([19], [21]).
(vii) From this history, the President observed, it can be seen that the Board, for the purposes of South Australian law, was established on 1 July 2010 when the text of the Queensland law was applied in South Australia, and then continued by the subsequent regulations made in South Australia ([28]).
Is the Board one entity or several?
(viii) The Board submitted that the scheme, properly construed, creates a single body and not multiple bodies for each State with the same name and appointees. This, the President accepted, was certainly the aim of the creators of the scheme, as conveyed by s 7 of the National Law (which provides for “one single national entity” with functions conferred on it “by this Law as applied by Acts of each participating jurisdiction”) ([29]).
(ix) The President accepted that, in general, an entity may gather attributes, including corporate status, from a variety of sources: R v Cawthorne; Ex parte Federated Clerks’ Union of Australia (South Australia Branch) (1979) 22 SASR 433 at 436 per King CJ.
(x) Her Honour also noted the High Court’s finding that a single body can derive its powers from both Commonwealth and State sources: R v Duncan; Ex parte Australian Iron and Steel Proprietary Ltd [1983] HCA 29; (1983) 158 CLR 535.
(xi) However, the President did not express a conclusive view on whether the Medical Board is a single entity or has multiple “emanations”. All that was necessary in this case was to identify the party to the proceedings as the Board established under the South Australian Act, whose “corporate status and various other characteristics, for the purposes of th[e] proceedings, are derived from the provisions of [that Act]” ([29]-[32]).
Is the Board a State?
Significance of provision in the National Law that the Board “represents the State”
(i) Section 31A(2) of the National Law provides that the Board is a “body corporate” which “represents the State” – a relatively common characteristic attributed to entities created by legislation ([34]-[35]).
(ii) In the President’s view, this provision not only does not establish that the Board is the State, but is an indicator in support of the proposition that the Board is not the State. The inclusion of the provision suggests that the drafters wanted to ensure that “the Board’s rights and liabilities would be found to be those of the State in certain circumstances”, and that, “without such statement, that may not occur… [because] the Board might be found not to be the State” ([36]).
Characteristics of the Board
(iii) In any event, the words of that provision are not conclusive. Rather, “a proper construction occurs by an examination of the relevant characteristics of the entity to determine whether it is a state” ([37]).
(iv) The President accepted the following characteristics identified by the Board as indicia of an entity constituting a State ([37]):
- The degree of control exercisable by the State over the Board’s decision-making;
- The extent of the governmental functions performed by the Board;
- Whether the Board has corporators or is solely a creature of the State;
- Whether the Board’s funding is derived from Consolidated Revenue and to what extent;
- The operation of the mechanisms of scrutiny over the Board;
- Whether the Board’s employees are treated as part of the Public Service.
(v) To these factors, the President added a “duty to discharge functions in the public interest” and a “requirement that the body performing the function is accountable within the Westminster system of responsible government” ([40]-[41]).
(vi) Although the Board’s functions of registering, accrediting and disciplining health practitioners have a regulatory or governmental character, the President accepted that the function of overseeing a profession is one that is sometimes vested in private bodies ([39]).
(vii) Although the National Law requires Members of the Board to act in the public interest, this falls short of requiring the Board itself to do so ([40]).
(viii) The Ministerial Council has a degree of control over the Board, but that control is limited by being shared amongst multiple governments. While the Ministerial Council is involved in appointing Members of the Board, this does not amount to Ministerial control over the entire body, and Members are not directly accountable for the decisions they make after their appointment. ([42]).
(ix) The Board may, without Ministerial Council approval, approve codes and guidelines for registered health practitioners, determine its accreditation process, and apply the registration system to individual practitioners ([43]).
(x) These elements of the governance scheme indicate that the Board’s activities lack the necessary control suggestive of accountability within the concept of the doctrine of responsible government. The Board is not answerable to any or all of the parliaments of the participating jurisdictions, either directly or through Ministers ([44]).
(xi) The Board’s source of funding, which is controlled by AHPRA under the National Law, is not a strong factor telling for or against the Board’s character as a State. However, other indicia, including being subject to an oversight body and having employees who are public servants, are present ([45]-[46]).
(xii) Considering all these factors, the President found that the Board is not the State, as it lacks the proximity to parliamentary accountability necessary to have that characteristic ([47]).
Complete diversity between the parties
(xiii) The Board also canvassed the possibility that it could be characterised as being six states (one for each jurisdiction that has enacted the National Law). If the Board could be characterised as the State of Victoria, then “complete diversity” between the parties would not be established and s 75 not engaged ([48]).
(xiv) In light of the President’s conclusion that the Board does not constitute a State, it was unnecessary to consider whether it follows that it constitutes all six States including the State of Victoria ([50]).
(xv) However, the President found that, if she was wrong and the Board is a State, the Board would be the State of South Australia, having regard to the wording of the South Australian Act ([52]).
Conclusion
(xvi) The President concluded that the Board is not a State for the purposes of s 75 of the Constitution, and as such, SACAT could determine the complaint against Dr Yu. It was not necessary to consider whether the jurisdiction exercised by the Tribunal in determining the proceedings was judicial in character ([53]-[55]).
Read the decision on the Australasian Legal Information Institute (AustLII) website.
|
| NSW Court of Appeal - Bulletin
|
| The NSW Court of Appeal publishes a regular bulletin containing summaries of decisions of interest in Australia and internationally. Find below links to several such decisions from recent bulletins.
|
| Police Association of New South Wales v State of New South Wales [2020] NSWCA 3
EMPLOYMENT AND INDUSTRIAL LAW – Public sector – Police – Misconduct and unsatisfactory performance – Powers of Commissioner – Power to order transfer of non-executive police officer to another position in case of “misconduct” – Whether particular transfer a “non-disciplinary transfer” – Meaning of “non-disciplinary transfer”.
Read the decision on the NSW Caselaw website.
|
| Crown Resorts Limited v Zantran Pty Limited [2020] FCAFC 1
CONTRACTS – express obligations of confidence allegedly preventing voluntary communications with the solicitors for opposing party in litigation – primary judge followed AS v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Ruling No 6) [2016] VSC 774; 53 VR 631 in exercising a discretion to relieve persons owing otherwise enforceable obligations of confidence to facilitate the overarching purpose of civil litigation rather than considering whether the provisions were void at law because they had a tendency to interfere adversely with the administration of justice or were enforceable by way of injunction in equity – held that the approach in AS v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Ruling No 6) is contrary to principle leading to error in the making of the primary judge’s order
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION – consideration of the sources of obligations of confidence
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – consideration of orthodox approaches to enforcing obligations of confidence and obtaining information from potential witnesses in advance of trial
Read the decision on the Federal Court of Australia website.
|
| Randren House Pty Ltd v Water Administration Ministerial Corporation [2020] NSWCA 14
APPEALS – time for commencing appeal – orders made dismissing applicants’ claims - costs orders made months later - whether time for appeal only ran from costs orders – whether applicants should have an extension of time – whether applicants had sufficiently explained delay – extension of time for appeal refused
JUDICIAL REVIEW – applicants’ land claimed to be affected by Minister’s plan made under Water Management Act 2000 (NSW) – applicants brought judicial review proceedings challenging numerous decisions including making of the Minister’s plan – proceedings dismissed as not brought within 3 months as required by s 47 – application to reopen after judgment reserved refused – all bases of judicial review rejected – whether primary judge erred in finding proceedings statute-barred – whether Minister entitled to make decisions to make a plan at “high level” – whether Minister had duty to classify water sources of the State - whether first applicant should have been issued with a licence expressed in terms of unregulated water – whether error in refusing application to adduce further evidence – extension of time for appeal refused
Read the decision on the NSW Caselaw website.
|
| Duffy Kennedy Pty Ltd v Galileo Miranda Nominee Pty Ltd [2020] NSWCA 25
BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION – construction contracts – Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999 (NSW) – whether right to suspend work validly exercised – whether unpaid interest on late payment of “scheduled amount” forms part of the scheduled amount – the definition of “scheduled amount” does not include interest payable under s 11 on the unpaid amount of a progress payment unless that amount is included in a “scheduled amount”
CONTRACT – Breach of Contract – whether ‘show cause notice’ was validly issued in circumstances where the power to issue the notice was conferred on the principal’s representative – where principal was involved in the principal’s representative’s decision to issue the notice – notice validly issued as principal’s representative gave adequate and proper consideration to issuing the notice and it would be inconsistent with the principal’s right to see that its representative acts properly if it could not be involved in the decision
CONTRACT – Breach of Contract – whether ‘take out notice’ was validly issued where its validity was contingent on the principal’s representative being satisfied that the default that was the subject of the ‘show cause notice’ had not been remedied or the contractor had otherwise failed to show cause – not shown that the principal’s representative failed to give adequate and proper consideration to the issues – not shown that the principal’s representative did not possess the relevant satisfaction
EVIDENCE — Privileges — Without prejudice privilege – whether information obtained during the course of ‘without prejudice’ meetings can be used for purposes other than settlement – ‘without prejudice’ privilege is not based upon an implied agreement that if the negotiations do not result in an agreement for settlement of the dispute, the parties will make no use of what has been disclosed by the other party in the negotiations
Read the decision on the NSW Caselaw website.
|
| Von Schoeler v Allen Taylor and Company Ltd Trading as Boral Timber (No 2) [2020] FCAFC 13
HUMAN RIGHTS – discrimination – allegations of sexual harassment – vicarious liability – whether employer took all reasonable steps to prevent sexual harassment – delay between trial and decision by primary judge – whether judgment is unsafe due to delay of six years – whether primary judge failed to give adequate reasons – appeal allowed
Read the decision on the Federal Court of Australia website.
|
| | DISCLAIMER: This publication has been prepared for information purposes only. The NCAT Legal Bulletin should not be relied on as legal advice nor is it a substitute for reading the decisions in full. NCAT does not accept any liability to any person for the information (or the use of the information) which is provided in this publication.
|
| |
