| | | NCAT Appeal Panel Decisions Digest Issue 11 of 2020
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| The NCAT Appeal Panel Decisions Digest provides monthly keyword summaries of decisions of the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NCAT) Internal Appeal Panel.
This issue features summaries of the following Appeal Panel decisions handed down in December 2020: - ZOF v NSW Trustee and Guardian (No 2) [2020] NSWCATAP 254 – in which the Appeal Panel allowed an appeal from a decision in the Guardianship Division regarding a financial management order made for the appellant. In making the decision to allow the appeal, the Appeal Panel considered the personal and cultural impact of the financial management order on the appellant, who was a member of the Bandjalung and Ngunawal people and a member of the Stolen Generations. It also considered the utility of the order with regard to the extent of ZOF’s estate, which predominantly consisted of Centrelink payments, which had been excluded from the order made by the Tribunal below.
- Kincumber Nautical Village Pty Ltd v Morris [2020] NSWCATAP 263 – in which the Appeal Panel refused an application from the appellant requesting the Tribunal to refer questions of law, regarding the Residential (Land Lease) Communities Act 2013 (NSW) (RLLC Act), to the Supreme Court, under the Tribunal’s referral powers under s 54 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW). The Appeal Panel found that the RLLC Act specifically provided for disputes to be dealt with by the Tribunal, and found that the increased costs and formality of the Supreme Court would place unfair burdens upon the respondents.
- ECN v Commissioner of Police [2020] NSWCATAP 267 – in which the Appeal Panel upheld the decision of the Tribunal below and dismissed an appeal from a member of the public seeking further disclosure of documents from an internal investigation by the NSW Police Force, initiated by the appellant’s complaint of excessive force upon her arrest. The Appeal Panel found the Tribunal had made the correct decision in releasing some further documents, while refusing disclosure of others, due to the risk of prejudicing the internal police investigation process.
Each case title is hyperlinked to the full decision available on NSW Caselaw. |
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| Guardianship Division
Armstrong J, President; M D Schyvens, Deputy President; L Porter, General Member (Community)
In sum: The Appeal Panel allowed an appeal from a decision in the Guardianship Division regarding a financial management order made for the appellant. In making the decision to allow the appeal, the Appeal Panel considered the personal and cultural impact of the financial management order on the appellant, who was a member of the Stolen Generations, and the utility of the order with regard to the extent of his estate.
Facts: The appellant, ZOF, the subject person in the decision subject to this appeal, is a 59-year-old man who identifies as a member of the Bandjalung and Ngunawal people and is from regional NSW. ZOF is a survivor of the Stolen Generations. He was taken from his parents as an infant, and placed into another family, and then into a group home at age nine or ten. He now lives with his auntie, ZOH, in another part of regional NSW. In 2018 ZOF was the recipient of a $75,000 ex gratia payment as part of the NSW Stolen Generations Reparations Scheme. Those funds were disbursed and spent predominantly for the benefit of the appellant’s family and friends. ZOF receives a Disability Support Pension ([4]-[5], [11]).
The appellant was subject to a decision by the Guardianship Division in October 2019, which made a financial management order, appointing the NSW Trustee and Guardian (TAG) to manage his estate. Proceedings were initiated by an application from ZOG, the appellant’s cousin, who said another lump sum payment was expected and that she was concerned family members may take the payment from the appellant. The Tribunal’s order excluded ZOF’s Centrelink income from being subject to management. The appeal was dealt with by way of a new hearing in September 2020, when the Tribunal’s October 2019 orders were set aside, and in substitution, orders were made that the application for the appointment of the financial manager for ZOF be dismissed ([1]-[2], [5]).
Section 25G of the Guardianship Act 1987 (NSW) (Guardianship Act) says the Tribunal may make a financial management order in respect of a person only if the Tribunal has considered the person’s capability to manage their own affairs and is satisfied that: (a) the person is not capable of managing those affairs; and (b) there is a need for another person to manage those affairs on the person’s behalf; and (c) it is in the person’s best interests that the order be made ([9]).
Held (allowing the appeal):
(i) Section 25E makes clear that a finding of incapacity for self-management is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for the making of a financial management order under the Guardianship Act. The word “may”, used twice in s 25E, indicates that the powers conferred by the section may be exercised or not, at the Tribunal’s discretion, as per s 9 of the Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW). However it must be noted that the Tribunal’s discretionary powers are confined by the subject matter and purpose of the protective jurisdiction. Ultimately, as per s 4 of the Guardianship Act what is done or not done, must be measured against whether it is in the interests, and for the benefit, of the particular person in need of protection ([14]).
(ii) New evidence was submitted in the 18 months since the original application to the Tribunal was made, including the appellant’s direct evidence on the impact the order has had upon him, particularly his cultural identity, and a report by an expert witness who has studied the historical, cultural and familial context of money as it flows through Indigenous Australian households. No further documentary evidence regarding the appellant’s capacity to manage his affairs was submitted, and the Appeal Panel did not have the benefit of taking evidence from the health professionals who had authored the documentary evidence that was before it. The Tribunal accepted the un-contradicted evidence of the appellant as to the negative perception he has of the order, and how it diminishes his cultural identity ([12]-[13], [15], [38]).
(iii) Review of the evidence and submissions made in all proceedings indicates that no party or participant has at any stage suggested that the appellant is incapable of managing his “usual” everyday income and expenses, consisting of receipt of a Disability Support Pension and making payment of normal everyday expenses. No one has sought the appointment of a financial manager over all of the appellant’s estate and both the orders made appointing a financial manager for the appellant on 10 April 2019 and 3 October 2019 excluded the appellant’s “Centrelink income” from management. The appellant’s ability to manage more significant sums of money, such as potential further compensatory payments, has been the focus of proceedings ([11]).
(iv) The Appeal Panel accepted the submissions by the appellant that, as the financial management order made by the Tribunal excluded the appellant’s Centrelink income, and there had been no enhancements to the appellant’s estate since the order was made by way of compensation payment or otherwise, the appointed manager, the TAG, had actually not needed to manage any of the appellant’s estate since the order was made. In the appellant’s particular circumstances, as a member of the Stolen Generations which has amplified his negative perception of the financial management order, the order has proved to be of no utility ([28], [32]-[33], [40]).
(v) The Appeal Panel found that, as it was not satisfied that a financial management order was in the best interests or for the benefit of the appellant, it should not exercise its discretion and allow for the financial management order to continue over any part of the appellant’s estate. The appellant’s present income is limited to Centrelink payments, which there is no evidence the appellant cannot manage. Although it is more probable than not that the appellant will receive some further compensatory payment, it is too speculative to suggest this could currently form the basis of a finding of a need for a financial manager ([34], [36]).
(vi) The Appeal Panel was mindful of the fact that, not having the necessary and relevant evidence before it, it did not express a definitive view on the appellant’s capability to manage his estate if he were to receive another compensatory payment. If this were to occur, and the matter returned to the Tribunal, the Tribunal would have to address this matter more definitively ([41]-[42]).
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| Consumer and Commercial Division - Residential Communities S Westgarth, Deputy President
In sum: The Appeal Panel refused an application from the appellant requesting questions of law, regarding the Residential (Land Lease) Communities Act 2013 (NSW), be referred directly to the Supreme Court, by way of the Tribunal’s referral powers under s 54 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW).
Facts: The appellant asked the Tribunal to refer questions of law to the Supreme Court, in a matter in the Consumer and Commercial Division regarding statutory construction of the Residential (Land Lease) Communities Act 2013 (NSW) (RLLC Act). Under s 54 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) (NCAT Act) the Tribunal may, by its own motion or at the request of a party, refer a question of law to the Supreme Court, if the President consents in writing ([1], [16]).
Held (refusing the application to refer questions of law to the Supreme Court, ordering the respondents to file and serve a Reply to Appeal on or before 18 December 2020, and listing the appeal for call-over and directions on 21 December 2020):
(i) It is clear from the provisions of the RLLC Act that Parliament intended that disputes between operators and residents regulated in their arrangements by that Act would preferably be determined by the Tribunal. Section 156 of the RLLC Act provides that a homeowner, former homeowner or operator may apply to the Tribunal for determination of (inter alia) a dispute arising from or relating to a site agreement. Section 157 deals with orders that may be made by the Tribunal, including an order that restrains an action in breach of the Act or a site agreement. Section 68 provides that a homeowner under a site agreement may apply to the Tribunal for an order directing the refund of overpaid site fees on the ground that the increase of site fees did not comply with the requirement of “this Division” i.e. Part 6 Division 3 which concerns “Increase of site fees” ([17]).
(ii) The appellant seeks a referral, requiring the President’s written consent, to appeal questions of law to the Supreme Court. The appellant seeks this referral in order to secure an authoritative decision, and to enable it to appeal directly to the Court of Appeal. Alternatively, the appellant could appeal to the Court of Appeal where the President, who is a Justice of the Supreme Court, or another Judge at NCAT, sits on an Appeal Panel for this matter ([12], [16], [19], [22]).
(iii) The circumstances of the case are insufficient to make it appropriate to make the referral as requested. The appellant’s desire to go straight to the Court of Appeal is insufficient reasoning for a referral, particularly as this is not a case where there are conflicting decisions of previous appeal panels, creating a necessity for clarification of the law from a superior court. Further, Parliament has clearly indicated in the provisions of the RLLC Act that it intended for disputes arising under the Act to be resolved in the Tribunal (subject to the appeal rights from the Tribunal) ([20], [22]).
(iv) If they were to be accepted, the appellant’s submissions may suggest that where a party to an appeal at the Tribunal foreshadows an appeal from an adverse decision to the Court of Appeal, the Tribunal should acquiesce in the referral. This would evidently counteract the intention of Parliament, as discussed above ([21]).
(v) The appellant’s desire to go directly to the Supreme Court places burdens on the respondents. The appellant’s conditional offer not to seek costs incurred in Supreme Court proceedings still leaves open the possibility that the respondents will be burdened by the risk of a costs order, as they have not accepted the appellant’s offer. The greater level of formality at the Supreme Court is also a burden to the respondents ([23]-[24]).
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| Administrative and Equal Opportunity Division
Dr R Dubler SC, Senior Member; J Kearney, Senior Member
In sum: The Appeal Panel upheld the decision of the Tribunal below and dismissed an appeal from a member of the public seeking further disclosure of documents from an internal investigation by the NSW Police Force, initiated by the appellant’s complaint of excessive force upon her arrest.
Facts: The appellant was arrested by a police officer in September 2018 and charged with four criminal offences. The charges against the appellant were later withdrawn. The appellant wrote to the respondent in December 2018, raising concerns regarding her arrest, including an allegation that the police had used excessive force. The respondent replied that it would investigate the appellant’s concerns, as a complaint under Part 8A of the Police Act 1990 (NSW) (Police Act). In July 2019, the respondent informed the appellant that the result of its investigation was that no further action would be taken against the relevant police officers ([2]-[4]).
The appellant made an access application pursuant to the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW) (GIPA Act) seeking various documents from the respondent in July 2019. The respondent provided partial access in August 2019. The appellant sought administrative review of this decision under s 100 of the GIPA Act ([5]-[7]).
The Tribunal approved the release of some further documents, but declined to order the release of other documents held by the respondent. The appellant appealed to the Appeal Panel ([9]).
Held (dismissing the appeal):
(i) There exists, under s 5 of the GIPA Act, a presumption in favour of disclosure of government information due to the general public interest, among other considerations discussed in s 12. However, according the “public interest test” in s 13, an overriding public interest against disclosure may exist if public interest considerations in favour of disclosure are outweighed by those in favour of non-disclosure, as discussed in s 14. Unless subject to exceptions under the GIPA Act, s 105 sets out that the burden of establishing that the decision is justified lies on the agency. Sch 1 cl 5 sets out that there is a presumption of an overriding public interest against disclosure of information that would be privileged from production in legal proceedings on the ground of client legal privilege ([16]).
Whether the Tribunal failed to consider the issue of client legal privilege properly – NO
(ii) Document 27, containing legal advice to the respondent, was, among other documents, requested by the appellant. It was prepared by a person not certified to practise law in NSW, but was reviewed and signed by Chief Inspector Carey, and the appellant did not challenge the Tribunal’s finding that it was advice of a lawyer within the meaning of s 117 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) (Evidence Act). The appellant also, rightly, accepted that CI Carey is subject to an express or implied obligation to maintain confidentiality of communication between himself and his internal clients. The two issues are whether or not the request and advice was for the dominant purpose of obtaining and providing legal advice, and whether or not, due to the extent of the information disclosed to the appellant, privilege has been waived ([18], [38]-[39], [41]).
(iii) The Tribunal has confirmed that the use of the words “client legal privilege” in Sch 1 cl 5 indicates that the GIPA Act adopts the Evidence Act test in relation to the existence of client legal privilege and waiver of this privilege. The Tribunal reviewed the legal advice in question, drawing the available inferences from the document itself, accepted the evidence, and specifically dealt with the issue of waiver. The Appeal Panel found that it was plain that the Tribunal was satisfied of the elements which make out a claim of client legal principle pursuant to s 118 of the Evidence Act, including whether or not the advice was prepared for the dominant purpose of obtaining and providing legal advice and that the privilege had not been waived ([42], [44]-[46]).
(iv) Section 62 obliges the Tribunal to provide notice of any decisions made to parties. Failure to provide reasons or adequate reasons, assuming an obligation to provide reasons, is an error of law. Even if the reasons in this matter could be regarded as inadequate, a different result or the matter being remitted should not result. As established by Meagher JA in Beale v Government Insurance Office of NSW (1997) 48 NSWLR 430 at [444], inadequacy of reasons for a decision do not automatically result in an appealable error, noting “Examination of nearly an statement of reasons with a fine-toothed comb would throw up some inadequacies” ([47], [49]-[50]).
(v) An appealable error does not necessitate a new hearing, and an appeal court is entitled to decide the matter. Assuming the error of law put forward by the appellant is established, the Appeal Panel was invited by the parties to examine Document 27 and the evidence led by the parties. The Appeal Panel was satisfied that Document 27 was properly the subject of a claim for legal client privilege because the request for advice gave rise to the natural and obvious inference that Document 27 was prepared for the dominant purpose of providing legal advice to the respondent. Further, the privilege had not been waived, particularly as CI Carey gave evidence that privilege of NSW Police Force legal advice can only be waived by the Commissioner of Police, which had not been done for Document 27 ([51]-[55]).
Whether the Tribunal’s decision in relation to other documents was illogical, irrational or unreasonable because it did not properly balance the relevant considerations mandated by s 13 of the GIPA Act – NO
(vi) The High Court clearly stated in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16 that a court or tribunal should be slow to intervene or affirm that the decision is irrational or illogical. If logical or rational minds might differ in their opinion of or conclusion on the same evidence, the decision cannot be seen to be illogical, irrational or unreasonable. The key question is whether the finding of the Tribunal was open to it on the evidence or whether the finding has any evidentiary basis ([67]-[68]).
(vii) An overly demanding standard of evidence being required to support the application of the consideration in the table to s 14 of the GIPA Act, and whether disclosure of information can “reasonably be expected” to have the stated effect(s), should not be given. Due to the forward looking nature of many of the s 14 Table considerations, the analysis may necessarily be abstract or at a broader operational level, rather than on the particulars of the present case ([69]-[70]).
(viii) The Appeal Panel dismissed this ground of appeal as it could not be found that no reasonable Tribunal could have come to the same conclusion as the Tribunal below. There existed a reasonable basis to find that cls 1(d), (f) and 2(b) of the s 14 Table applied. Disclosure of the documents under this ground, which contained information generated in the internal investigation for misconduct complaints, could reasonably be expected to prejudice the respondent’s functions in conducting such investigations and in performing their human resource functions ([71]-[75]).
Whether there was a denial of procedural fairness or a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction, caused by a failure to engage with, or respond to, substantial, clearly articulated arguments relying upon established facts – NO
(ix) Further documents, including Document 2, requested by the appellant contained personal information of police officers and would disclose the identity of various members of the public who gave evidence for the internal investigation. The appellant argued that the Tribunal failed to consider her arguments: firstly that the witnesses were prepared to give evidence in court, and so could have no expectation of confidentiality, and secondly the analysis in Applicants v Commissioner of Police [2015] NSWCATAD 22 applied to the case but was not addressed by the Tribunal. With regard to the second argument, the Appeal Panel accepted the submissions of the respondent that the Tribunal was under no obligation to refer to that case ([80]-[81], [83], [93]).
(x) The Appeal Panel upheld the Tribunal’s findings that disclosure of the documents would prejudice the investigation of a possible contravention of the law by disclosing investigatory methods that are not publicly known, for the purpose of cl 2(b). Disclosure of Document 2 would identify lines of enquiry and potential conduct issues that may not be apparent from the allegations received by the respondent in order to identify additional matters for investigation and broader operational issues for the respondent, and parts of the document did not directly relate to an allegation raised in the appellant’s complaint. The Tribunal was correct in its careful consideration of which documents to disclose, and appropriately disclosed further non-confidential information to the appellant ([89], [91]-[92]).
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| | | Guardianship Division
Decision of: Armstrong J, President; M D Schyvens, Deputy President; L Porter, General Member (Community)
Catchwords: APPEAL – Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NSW) – Guardianship Division – internal appeal – new hearing – financial management order – whether it is in the best interests of the subject person that a financial management order be made – consideration of the subject person’s cultural and linguistic background – subject person a member of the Stolen Generations – cultural aversion to government and institutional control – likely that subject person would receive large compensation sum of unknown quantum at unknown time in future – subject person capable of managing their own affairs at present – no need for a financial management order – financial management order not in subject person’s best interests – financial management application dismissed
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| Consumer and Commercial Division - Home Building Decision of: G Curtin SC, Senior Member; D Robertson, Senior Member
Catchwords: LEASES AND TENANCIES – Residential Tenancies – Termination of tenancy – Vacant possession –Tenant left premises but did not return keys – Tenancy did not terminate until keys returned |
| Consumer and Commercial Division - Motor Vehicles Decision of: G Curtin SC, Senior Member; S Thode, Senior Member
Catchwords: CONSUMER LAW – false or misleading representations – defence that settlement agreement entered into preventing proceedings being brought on false or misleading representations – no evidence of settlement agreement at the hearing or on appeal
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – hearing rule – notice – allegation that not contacted by telephone for hearing – procedural unfairness – new hearing – appellant required to prove possibility of a successful outcome if new hearing ordered – no evidence of alleged defence – no possibility of a successful outcome if a new hearing ordered
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| Administrative and Equal Opportunity Division Decision of: A Britton, Principal Member
Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW — whether “information not held decision” made under s 58(1)(b) of the Government Information (Public Access) Act is the correct and preferable decision
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| Consumer and Commercial Division - Commercial
Decision of: S Westgarth, Deputy President; S Goodman SC, Senior Member
Catchwords: APPEAL - no error of law - leave to appeal - claim against agent
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| Consumer and Commercial Division - Tenancy
Decision of: S Thode, Senior Member; D Robertson, Senior Member
Catchwords: LAND LAW - Residential Tenancy - findings of fact – no error of law
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| Consumer and Commercial Division - Commercial
Decision of: G Curtin SC, Senior Member; A Boxall, Senior Member
Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – bias rule – double might test – no evidence of bias
CIVIL PROCEDURE – res judicata – fresh proceedings on the same causes of action – no point of principle
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| Consumer and Commercial Division - Tenancy Decision of: G Curtin SC, Senior Member; D Charles, Senior Member
Catchwords: LANDLORD AND TENANT – covenants – reasonably clean and fit to live in – quiet enjoyment – breach by landlord – no questions of law identified or apparent – grounds not made out for leave to appeal
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| Consumer and Commercial Division - Residential Communities Decision of: S Westgarth, Deputy President
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – questions of law – application to refer questions to Supreme Court – facts relevant to exercise of discretion
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| Administrative and Equal Opportunity Division
Decision of: Hennessy ADCJ, Deputy President; D Goldstein, Senior Member
Catchwords: TAXES AND DUTIES - payroll tax – liability to taxation – contractor provisions – whether contractors engaged under a “relevant contract”
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION - whether taxpayer was supplied with services ancillary to the conveyance of goods by means of a vehicle provided by the person conveying them under exemption in s 32(2)(d) of the Payroll Tax Act 2007 – whether taxpayer is supplied with services of a kind ordinarily required for less than 180 days in a financial year under exemption in s 32(2)(b)(ii) of the Payroll Tax Act 2007
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| Administrative and Equal Opportunity Division Decision of: A Suthers, Principal Member
Catchwords: APPEALS – Interlocutory - Firearms Licence - Stay
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| Consumer and Commercial Division - Home Building
Decision of: T Simon, Principal Member; D Fairlie, Senior Member
Catchwords: APPEAL - HOME BUILDING - ancillary order - offer of consent judgment - Tribunal's discretion
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| Consumer and Commercial Division - Tenancy
Decision of: G Blake AM SC, Senior Member; L Wilson, Senior Member
Catchwords: RESIDENTIAL TENANCY – termination notice given to take effect at the end of the fixed term – parties negotiating for rent reduction with agreement reached after termination notice given – whether moratorium on giving termination notice under cl 41C of the Residential Tenancies Regulation 2019 (NSW) – no errors of law - leave to appeal sought - against the weight of the evidence - leave refused
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| Administrative and Equal Opportunity Division
Decision of: Dr R Dubler SC, Senior Member; J Kearney, Senior Member
Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – public access to government information – whether Tribunal failed to consider properly whether documents were subject to legal advice privilege – whether decision to decline access to other documents was illogical, irrational or unreasonable because the Tribunal failed properly to balance the relevant considerations mandated by s 13 of the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW) – whether the Tribunal failed to engage with and respond to arguments put forward by the appellant
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| Consumer and Commercial Division - Strata
Decision of: A Britton, Principal Member
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE — stay of the decision under appeal — assessment of prejudice to the parties if stay is refused
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| Consumer and Commercial Division - Tenancy
Decision of: G Curtin SC, Senior Member; P Molony, Senior Member
Catchwords: CIVIL PROCEDURE — hearing — ex parte — procedural fairness — appellant aware of hearing date but attended medical appointment instead – Tribunal complied with statutory duties – no procedural unfairness
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| Consumer and Commercial Division - Commercial Decision of: G Blake AM SC, Senior Member; Dr J Lucy, Senior Member
Catchwords: ENVIRONMENT AND PLANNING — Fences and boundaries — “Dividing fence” – Definition of fence – Replacement of retaining wall and dividing fence - Whether retaining wall was “any foundation or support necessary for the support and maintenance of the fence” – Whether there was a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction by not determining whether the tree or trees on or near the common boundary should be removed – Whether the contribution required from the adjoining owner includes engineering costs for the retaining wall
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| Consumer and Commercial Division - Strata Decision of: P Durack, Senior Member; M Gracie, Senior Member
Catchwords: LAND LAW — Strata title - Strata Schemes Management Act 2015 - use or enjoyment of common property and lot – video cameras installed by lot owner inside lot, not on common property - no finding that interference by appellant was unreasonable under s 153 (1) Strata Schemes Management Act 2015 - question of law - nuisance - absence of reasons
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| Consumer and Commercial Division - Tenancy
Decision of: S Westgarth, Deputy President
Catchwords: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – Diversity jurisdiction – residents of different States –jurisdiction of the Tribunal
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| Guardianship Division
Decision of: A Britton, Principal Member; J Kearney, Senior Member; M Bolt, General Member
Catchwords: APPEAL — principles applying to granting leave to appeal from decision made by Guardianship Division of the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal
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| Consumer and Commercial Division
Decision of: A P Coleman SC, Senior Member; M Gracie, Senior Member
Catchwords: REAL ESTATE AGENTS – managing agent contract- compliance with Property and Stock Agents Act 2002
CONSUMER CLAIM – time limit on making claims
LIMITATION OF ACTION- time for commencing proceedings for consumer claims
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| Consumer and Commercial Division - Tenancy
Decision of: G Blake AM SC, Senior Member; Dr J Lucy, Senior Member
Catchwords: APPEALS – Residential tenancy proceedings – Where tenant did not appear at hearing and Tribunal made orders terminating the residential tenancy agreement and for the payment of rental arrears – Where tenant claimed that the Tribunal did not telephone him at the time of the hearing – Whether evidence established that Tribunal failed to telephone the tenant – Whether leave should be granted to appeal on ground that finding about rental arrears was erroneous
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| | DISCLAIMER: This publication has been prepared for information purposes only. The NCAT Appeal Panel Decisions Digest should not be relied on as legal advice nor is it a substitute for reading the decisions in full. NCAT does not accept any liability to any person for the information (or the use of the information) which is provided in this publication.
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