| | | | | | | NCAT Appeal Decisions Digest June 2017 Decisions
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| | The NCAT Appeal Decisions Digest provides monthly keyword summaries of decisions of the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NCAT) Internal Appeal Panel.
Under the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013, parties have a right to appeal to the Internal Appeal Panel from any decision made by the Tribunal in proceedings for a general decision or an administrative review decision. Detailed information about appeals is available on the NCAT website.
The following NCAT Appeal Panel decisions were handed down during the month of June 2017. Each case title is hyperlinked to the full decision available on NSW Caselaw. |
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| The following case summaries are of significant decisions handed down by the NCAT Appeal Panel during June 2017.
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| ZCI v ZCJ [2017] NSWCATAP 131
Guardianship Division
Judgment of: C Fougere, Principal Member; G Walker, Senior Member; M Wroth, Senior Member
Summary: The Appeal Panel dismissed an appeal from the Tribunal below, finding that the Tribunal did not deny the appellant procedural fairness (at [67]) and that the appellant had failed to satisfy the Appeal Panel that leave to appeal should be granted on questions other than questions of law (at [80], [84] and [89]).
In doing so, the Appeal Panel held (at [55]-[56] and [70]-[71]) that, because the proceedings below had been before the Guardianship Division, regard must be had to considerations relevant to the Tribunal’s protective jurisdiction.
In relation to the procedural fairness appeal ground, the Appeal Panel observed the statement of a previous Appeal Panel, in BTD v NSW Trustee and Guardian [2015] NSWCATAP 87 at [14]-[15], namely:
“[14] The Guardianship Division is required to comply with the rules of procedural fairness, which are also known as the rules of natural justice: NCAT Act, s 38(2). Those rules require that a person be afforded a fair and unbiased hearing before decisions are taken which affect them: Aronson, Dyer and Groves, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, (5th ed 2013 LawBook Co) at 397. In particular the hearing rule, which is an element of procedural fairness, requires that a decision-maker hear a person before making a decision affecting their interests. McHugh J spoke generally of this rule in Re Refugee Tribunal; ex parte Aala [2000] HCA 57; (2000) 75 ALJR 52 at 73:
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[15] The content of the hearing rule must be "appropriate and adapted to the circumstances of the particular case": Kioa v West [1985] HCA 81; (1985) 159 CLR 550 per Mason J at 585. The Guardianship Division’s jurisdiction is a protective one. One of its primary aims is to protect vulnerable people from neglect, abuse and exploitation: [Guardianship] Act 1987 (NSW), s 4(g). But that is not its only obligation. The Guardianship Division of the Tribunal is also obliged to ensure that people who are parties to applications receive a fair hearing from an impartial decision-maker. The Tribunal is obliged to disclose to parties who have an interest in the proceedings, the substance of any adverse or prejudicial information and give them a reasonable opportunity to respond: KV v Protective & Ors; KW & Ors v KV & Ors (No.2) [2004] NSWADTAP 48.”
In the light of these observations, the Appeal Panel held (at [57]) that:
“In determining whether the appellant was denied procedural fairness, the question for the Appeal Panel is whether he had a reasonable opportunity to respond to any adverse or prejudicial information.”
In relation to the appeal grounds that arose from questions other than questions of law, the Appeal Panel observed (at [69]) that the general principles that govern the granting of leave to appeal in accordance with s 80(2)(b) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) are set out in Collins v Urban [2014] NSWCATAP 17 at [84].
The Appeal Panel then considered (at [82]) C v W [2015] NSWSC 1774 and SAB v SEM [2013] NSWSC 253, which discussed the principles that govern the granting of leave to appeal to the Supreme Court from a decision of the Guardianship Division of the Tribunal and the then-NSW Guardianship Tribunal, respectively. The following relevant principles, in relation to whether leave to appeal should be granted for matters arising out of the Guardianship Division, have been distilled from those decisions:
1) It is not enough that a judge might consider that he or she would have reached a different conclusion on the facts from the conclusion reached by the Tribunal: SAB v SEM at [9];
2) The grant or withholding of leave is to be exercised having regard to the general principles in s 4 of the Guardianship Act 1987 (NSW), including the principle that the welfare and interests of the person with disabilities is to be given paramount consideration. But that is not to say that the gateway requiring leave to appeal can be emasculated by the Court's too readily engaging in a detailed review of the facts with a view to detecting possible error: SAB v SEM at [10]
3) The Court generally needs to be satisfied that there is a question of principle or policy, or a manifest error in the decision or decision-making process under review, which merits a grant of leave: C v W at [44];
4) Given the broad evaluative or discretionary content of a decision to make, or to decline to make, a financial management order, appellate interference with such a decision will generally require identification of an error of principle or the like: House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 504-505. The terms in which these distinct gateways to appellate review are expressed should not be overlooked. They all point in the direction of requiring identification of some error beyond a mere error of fact: C v W at [45];
5) Given the broad evaluative or discretionary content of most decisions made on an exercise of protective jurisdiction, guidance about what is or may be an error of principle may, in particular cases, be derived from House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 504-505: C v W at [46].
The relevant principles set out in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 504-505, referred to above, are as follows:
“The manner in which an appeal against an exercise of discretion should be determined is governed by established principles. It is not enough that the judges composing the appellate court consider that, if they had been in the position of the primary judge, they would have taken a different course. It must appear that some error has been made in exercising the discretion. If the judge acts upon a wrong principle, if he allows extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect him, if he mistakes the facts, if he does not take into account some material consideration, then his determination should be reviewed and the appellate court may exercise its own discretion in substitution for his if it has the materials for doing so. It may not appear how the primary judge has reached the result embodied in his order, but, if upon the facts it is unreasonable or plainly unjust, the appellate court may infer that in some way there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion which the law reposes in the court of first instance.”
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| Violet v Ghaderi-Araghi [2017] NSWCATAP 134
Consumer and Commercial Division - Residential Tenancies
Judgment of: A P Coleman SC, Senior Member; R C Titterton, Senior Member Summary: The Appeal Panel dismissed an appeal from the Tribunal below, holding that damages for non-economic loss are available to a tenant for loss of enjoyment of premises in circumstances where the tenant has been unlawfully “locked out” of their rental premises. The Tribunal at first instance found that the landlord had unlawfully locked out the tenant, in breach of the parties’ residential tenancies agreement and s 120 of the Residential Tenancies Act 2010 (NSW). It ordered that compensation be paid to the tenant for his loss of enjoyment of the premises in accordance with the Supreme Court’s decision in Tralee Technology Holding Pty Ltd v Yun Chen [2015] NSWSC 1259. The landlord appealed the decision on several grounds, including that the Tribunal had misapplied Tralee and that the Tribunal did not provide adequate reasons for its decision. In relation to the landlord’s first ground of appeal, the Appeal Panel summarised (at [32]-[33]) the Court’s decision in Tralee, holding (at [35]) that it had been correctly applied by the Tribunal below. In Tralee, the Court held (at [61]-[62]) that although provisions of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) applied to claims for damages for distress, anxiety or disappointment, those provisions did not apply to claims for damages for non-economic loss arising from a loss of enjoyment of property.
Accordingly, the Appeal Panel held (at [34]) that, applied to the present proceedings, the effect of Court’s decision (at [61]-[62]) was that “damages for non-economic loss are available for a loss of enjoyment of the premises”.
In relation to the landlord’s second ground of appeal, the Appeal Panel held (at [39]) that the Tribunal provided adequate reasons for its decision to award compensation. In doing so, the Appeal Panel summarised (at [37]) the Court of Appeal’s discussion in Pollard v RRR Corporation Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 110 at [56]ff on the duty to give adequate reasons for decisions as follows: “(1) A trial judge’s reasons (here the Tribunal’s) must, “as a minimum ... be adequate for the exercise of a facility of appeal”: Soulemezis v Dudley (Holdings) Pty Limited (1987) 10 NSWLR 247; Beale v Government Insurance Office of New South Wales (1997) 48 NSWLR 430;
(2) A superior court (here the Appeal Panel), “considering the decision of an inferior tribunal, should not be left to speculate from collateral observations as to the basis of a particular finding”: Soulemezis;
(3) The extent and content of reasons will depend upon the particular case under consideration and the matters in issue: Mifsud v Campbell (1991) 21 NSWLR 725; Hull v Thompson [2001] NSWCA 359;
(4) While a judge is not obliged to spell out every detail of the process of reasoning to a finding: Yates Property Corporation Pty Limited (In Liq) v Darling Harbour Authority (1991) 24 NSWLR 156; it is essential to expose the reasons for resolving a point critical to the contest between the parties: North Sydney Council v Ligon 302 Pty Ltd (1995) 87 LGERA 435;
(5) The reasons must do justice to the issues posed by the parties’ cases: see Moylan v Nutrasweet Co [2000] NSWCA 337. Discharge of this obligation is necessary to enable the parties to identify the basis of the judge’s decision and the extent to which their arguments had been understood and accepted: Soulemezis (at 279) per McHugh JA.”Furthermore, in relation to the quantum of compensation awarded, the Appeal Panel, citing Planet Fisheries P/L v La Rosa [1968] HCA 62; (1968) 119 CLR 118 and Carson v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd [1993] HCA 31; (1993) 178 CLR 44, observed (at [42]) that, although previous decisions may be useful as a guide to prevailing community standards, the Tribunal must consider the individual circumstances of each case in awarding compensation. Accordingly, the Appeal Panel held (at [43]) that “the award of $2,000 was an appropriate amount of compensation to order and within the range of relevant legal decisions and within the community’s expectations.” |
| Lokondo v Commissioner of Police [2017] NSWCATAP 137
Administrative and Equal Opportunity Division - Administrative review
Judgment of: M Craig, QC, Principal Member; Dr J Lucy, Senior Member Summary: The Appeal Panel dismissed an appeal from the Tribunal below, holding (at [29]-[30]) that s 26(1A) of the Security Industry Act 1997 (NSW), when read in conjunction with s 16(1) of that Act and cl 15(1)(c) of the Security Industry Regulations 2016, did not operate retrospectively, but instead created particular liabilities with respect to past matters. Accordingly, a person may have their license revoked under the Security Industry Act for events that transpired before 1 September 2016, being the date that s 26(1A) and cl 15(1)(c) came into force.
Section 26(1A) of the Security Industry Act states that:“The Commissioner must revoke a licence where the Commissioner is satisfied that, if the licensee were applying for a new licence, the application would be required by this Act to be refused.”Section 16(1) requires the Commissioner to reject an application for a license if the applicant has been convicted of an offence prescribed in the regulations.
Relevantly, on 2 November 2016 the Commissioner revoked the appellant’s license on the basis that, in 2011, the appellant had been convicted of an offence that fell within the compass of s 16(1), being an offence within the meaning of cl 15(1)(c). As s 26(1A) and cl 15(1)(c) came into force on 1 September 2016, the appellant argued that, when read together, these provisions offended the general principle that legislation should not be construed as operating retrospectively, insofar as his license had been revoked due to his 2011 conviction (at [26]).
Following the NSW Court of Appeal’s decision in Coleman v Shell Co of Australia Limited (1943) 45 SR (NSW) 27 at [31], the Appeal Panel held (at [28]) that when construing legislation “care must be taken to distinguish between legislation having a prior effect on past events and legislation providing for future action based on past events.”
The Appeal Panel then observed (at [29]) that McHugh and Gummow JJ had approved of this distinction in Commonwealth v SCI Operations Pty Limited (1998) 192 CLR 285; [1998] HCA 20. In that case, their Honours summarised (at [57]) this distinction as being:
“between a statute which provides that as at a past date the law should be taken to have been that which it was not, and the creation by statute of further particular rights or liabilities with respect to past matters or transactions.”Adopting this statement, the Appeal Panel held (at [30]) that s 26(1A), read with s 16(1)(a) and cl 15(1)(c), “falls into the second category of legislation identified in those cases”, observing that:“Although cl 15(1)(c) expanded the range of circumstances that enlivened the mandatory requirement imposed upon the Commissioner by s 26(1A) of the SI Act, when compared to the more limited circumstances that applied under cl 18(1)(c) of the 2007 Regulation, reliance upon those expanded circumstances to revoke the licence had effect only from the date of the decision to revoke. Those provisions, when read together, had no effect upon the validity of the licence or any lawful action taken in reliance upon it prior to the Commissioner’s right of revocation being exercised.” |
| Armee v Brealey [2017] NSWCATAP 141
Consumer and Commercial Division - Residential Tenancies
Judgment of: L P Robberds QC, Senior Member; Dr J Lucy, Senior Member Summary: The Appeal Panel allowed an appeal from the Tribunal below, holding that the Tribunal had erred in refusing the appellant an extension of time to rely upon late evidence (at [119]-[120]) and had also erred in refusing to grant the appellant an adjournment concerning the same subject matter (at [135]). In doing so, the Appeal Panel held (at [119] and [134]) that the Tribunal had, in effect, barred the appellant from prosecuting her case in the proceedings below.
In relation to the first error alleged, the Appeal Panel considered (at [103]) the principles applicable to the Tribunal’s discretion to extend time for the filing of evidence. The Appeal Panel relied on the principles as summarised in Mesiha v Murrell [2017] NSWCATAP 1 at [45] as follows:
“(1) the just resolution of proceedings remains the paramount consideration;
(2) what is a just resolution needs to be understood in the context of the purposes and objectives of the power granted to the Tribunal to resolve disputes and involves a weighing of all relevant matters;
(3) speed and efficiency, in the sense of minimum delay and expense are seen as essential to the just resolution of proceedings;
(4) a party should be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present its case;
(5) there are limits to what is necessary in providing a reasonable opportunity to be heard, which may involve the consideration of delay and cost both to the other party and to the Tribunal;
(6) the nature of the case and its importance to the party seeking an extension of time needs to be considered;
(7) reasons for failure to comply will generally need to be provided and must be weighed against the effect any delay will have both on the other party and upon the Tribunal;
(8) an award of costs may not always be adequate to deal with issues of prejudice, which include wasted time and strain imposed upon litigants;
(9) there is no absolute entitlement to an extension of time, even if the consequence of the refusal effectively prevents a party from presenting relevant evidence in support of its case."
The relevant question for the Appeal Panel was whether the Tribunal, by refusing the application to extend time for the provision of evidence, had incorrectly exercised its discretion (at [104]). Applying the principles listed above, the Appeal Panel observed (at [106]) that although “[t]he Tribunal placed emphasis on the matters in points (3) and (5)… [it] failed have to regard to points (4), (6) and (7).
Accordingly, the Appeal Panel held (at [120]) that the Tribunal had erred in refusing the appellant an extension of time to rely on late evidence, stating that:
“The Tribunal failed to have regard to the principle that the appellant (the applicant below) should be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present her case. It did not consider the nature of the appellant’s case and its importance to her and it did not have regard to, or seek, the appellant’s reasons for failure to comply with the directions for the filing and service of evidence. Rather, it determined the question of whether to admit the appellant’s evidence on the basis of its view that the appellant had more than sufficient time to prepare for her evidence. The Tribunal made that finding without considering what was involved in the appellant’s gathering together the evidence or the time which would be required to do so.”
In relation to the second error alleged, the Appeal Panel observed (at [121]) that the Tribunal’s power to adjourn proceedings came under s 51 of the NCAT Act, holding that such a power is to be exercised in accordance with the principles set out by the High Court in Expense Reduction Analysts Group Pty Ltd v Armstrong Strategic Management Pty Ltd [2013] HCA 46; (2013) 250 CLR 303 at [51]. Furthermore, the Appeal Panel held (at [121]) that:
“Procedural fairness may be denied if a decision maker fails to adjourn proceedings where such a failure has the effect of depriving a person of adequately presenting the person’s case.”
The Appeal Panel considered (at [122]-[125]) the relevant authorities concerning the role of an appellate court in reviewing a decision to refuse an adjournment. The Appeal Panel quoted (at [122]) the statement of Young JA (with whom Giles JA agreed) in Dubois v R & B Bergin Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 309 at [43]-[45], being that:
“It is not sufficient that the [appellate court] considers that an adjournment should have been granted, the applicant must show that refusal of the adjournment produced, in the circumstances, an injustice. It must be remembered too, that the decision is a discretionary judgment.
“Injustice” is a coloured word with pejorative overtones. What is meant is that the refusal of the adjournment must not set up a situation where there is a likelihood that there cannot be a fair trial unless that factor is outweighed by prejudice to the opposing party.
In making the balanced judgment required, a judge must also take into account the public interest that the judicial process must be just, cheap and quick.”
In the light of these principles, the Appeal Panel held (at [127]) that the Tribunal “did not consider whether the refusal of the adjournment application deprived the appellant of the opportunity of adequately presenting her case”, finding (at [128]) that “the Tribunal Member’s reasons for refusing the adjournment application do not show that any of the above authorities were taken into consideration”. Furthermore, it observed (at [129]-[130]) that (references omitted):
“Inconvenience to the respondent is not a sufficient reason for refusing an adjournment as is shown by the authorities referred to above… [and that]… The fact that an adjournment would result in waste of some costs and some degree of delay is not a sufficient reason for refusing an appropriate adjournment application….”
Accordingly, the Appeal Panel held (at [133]) that the appellant the refusal to grant an adjournment produced an injustice on the basis that “the refusal of the adjournment… [i]n reality meant that the appellant would fail on the claim concerning the mould.”
Finally, the Appeal Panel granted the appellant an extension of time (at [139]-[140]) to commence proceedings for the mould-related claims, in accordance with s 41 of the NCAT Act. In doing so, the Appeal Panel made the following observations (at [137]-[138]) concerning its power to grant such an extension:
1) The purpose of sections similar to s 41 is to eliminate the injustice a prospective plaintiff might suffer by reason of the imposition of a rigid time limit within which an action is to be commenced: Sola Optical Australia Pty Limited v Mills (1987) 163 CLR 628 at 635, approved in Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541 at 553.
2) For an applicant to obtain an extension of time they must show that it is fair and just for the extension to be given: Salido v Nominal Defendant (1993) 32 NSWLR 524 at 532; Hall v Nominal Defendant (1966) 117 CLR 423 at 429.
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| Ferguson v Compton [2017] NSWCATAP 144
Consumer and Commercial Division - Residential Tenancies
Judgment of: J Harris SC, Senior Member; D Fairlie, Senior MemberSummary: The Appeal Panel allowed an appeal from the Tribunal below, holding (at [26]-[27]) that, when read purposively, s 190(1) of the Residential Tenancies Act 2010 (NSW) provides a time limit for commencing a claim under s 190, but does not act as a pre-condition to limit the making of an application under that section.
Section 190(1) of the Residential Tenancies Act 2010 states that:
“(1) A landlord or a tenant may apply to the Tribunal for an order in relation to a breach of a residential tenancy agreement within the period prescribed by the regulations after the landlord or tenant becomes aware of the breach or within such other period as may be prescribed by the regulations.”
Regulation 22(9) relevantly provides that:
“For the purposes of section 190 (1) of the Act, the prescribed period for making an application for an order in relation to a breach of a residential tenancy agreement or proposed agreement is within 3 months after the applicant becomes aware of the breach.”
The Tribunal at first instance held that the landlord’s application under s 190(1) did not satisfy the requirements of that provision, because she had not been aware of any breach of the residential tenancy agreement at the time that she had made the application (at [12]).
The Appeal Panel held (at [21]) that the Tribunal below had misconstrued s 190(1) and, in dismissing the landlord’s application, had subsequently proceeded on the basis of an error of law, finding that:
“We consider that the member’s interpretation of section 190 to mean that it prohibits the bringing of an application for compensation for damage to the property unless the applicant establishes that she knew of the facts of the damage prior to the date of the application is erroneous.”
Applying a purposive approach to s 190(1), as required by s 33 of the Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW), the Appeal Panel held (at [26]-[27]) that:
“In our opinion, the purpose of both provisions is to establish a time limit for the bringing of an application. The limit is three months to be calculated from the point at which the relevant party (in this instance the landlord) becomes aware of the breach.
The purpose of the provision is not to make a statement about when the applicant’s cause of action accrues. It does follow as a matter of logic that ordinarily an application would not be made in relation to a breach of a tenancy agreement before the innocent party becomes aware of the breach. However, as the facts of the present case suggest, it is quite conceivable that a landlord might apply for termination of a lease and possession and then add a claim for compensation. At the time of filing the application, the landlord may not have been aware of the breach giving rise to an entitlement to compensation.”
Although the error of law had not been propounded by the landlord, the Appeal Panel observed (at [32]) that it had “obligations in matters where the parties are unrepresented”, noting the following statement of a previous Appeal Panel in Cominos v Di Rico [2016] NSWCATAP 5 at [13]:
“It may be difficult for self-represented appellant’s to clearly express their grounds of appeal. In such circumstances and having regard to the guiding principle, it is appropriate for the Appeal Panel to review the appellant’s stated grounds of appeal, the material provided, and the decision of the Tribunal at first instance to examine whether it is possible to discern grounds that may either raise a question of law or a basis for leave to appeal…. However, this must be balanced against the obligation to act fairly and impartially….”
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| | | Keyword summaries for all NCAT Appeal Panel decisions made during June 2017.
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| Barwick v Shetab [2017] NSWCATAP 127
Consumer and Commercial Division - Home Building
Judgment of: D Cowdroy ADCJ, QC, Principal Member; K Rosser, Principal MemberCatchwords: Appeal – Whether work residential building work – assessment of damages |
| Lee v Imad [2017] NSWCATAP 128
Consumer and Commercial Division - Residential Tenancies
Judgment of: A P Coleman SC – Senior Member; D Goldstein – Senior MemberCatchwords: PROCEDURAL DIRECTIONS: Tribunal failed to follow Procedural Direction with respect to acting as both decision maker and conciliator; irregularity leading to orders being set aside; CONCILIATION: process ought to take place before hearing of matter, particularly if member also acting conciliator; CONSENT ORDERS: Tribunal member acting as conciliator and hearing matter; effect on consent orders; where member expressed views on prospects of success during conciliation. Consent orders set aside. |
| Channell v Graham [2017] NSWCATAP 129
Consumer and Commercial Division - Home Building
Judgment of: S Westgarth, Deputy President; I Bailey SC, Senior MemberCatchwords: COSTS – Rules 38 and 38A - Reg 20(4) – withdrawal of appeal |
| C G Constructions Pty Limited v Hanson Constructions Materials Pty Limited [2017] NSWCATAP 130
Consumer and Commercial Division - General
Judgment of: M Craig QC, Principal Member; D Goldstein, Senior MemberCatchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Civil and Administrative Tribunal – internal appeal – question of law – failure to address case advanced at first instance – error of law – constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction – no finding on material question of fact – remittal of proceedings. |
| Liberant v Brisbane Water (NSW) Legacy Club [2017] NSWCATAP 132
Consumer and Commercial Division - Retirement Villages
Judgment of: S Westgarth, Deputy President; D Goldstein, Senior Member Catchwords: Extension of time – section 41 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 – regulations 38 and 55 of the Retirement Villages Regulations 2009 – requirements for giving termination notices. |
| | Administrative and Equal Opportunity Division
Judgment of: Wright J, President DAC Robertson, Senior Member
Catchwords: COSTS – whether special circumstances warranted an award of costs – appellant responsible for prolonging unreasonably the time taken to complete the proceedings – appellant’s claims had no tenable basis in fact or law – governing principle not to punish the appellant but to compensate the respondent– costs awarded.
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| Consumer and Commercial Division - Residential Tenancies
Judgment of: S Westgarth, Deputy President; R Titterton, Senior Member
Catchwords: Abandonment – break fee – s 107 of the Residential Tenancies Act 2010 - cl 41 – s 15.
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| Consumer and Commercial Division - General
Judgment of: S Westgarth, Deputy President; J Lucy, Senior Member
Catchwords: Extension of time to lodge appeal – quotations as evidence.
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| Consumer and Commercial Division - Retirement Villages
Judgment of: S Westgarth, Deputy President; L Pearson, Principal Member
Catchwords: Retirement Villages Act 1999 and Retirement Villages Regulations 2009 – amending village rules – returning officer – making good deficits.
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| Consumer and Commercial Division - Home Building
Judgment of: Dr J Renwick SC, Senior Member; T Simon, Senior Member
Catchwords: Civil and Administrative Tribunal – Appeal Panel – s440D, consent, costs, in liquidation.
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| Consumer and Commercial Division - General
Judgment of: PR Callaghan SC, Principal Member; J McAteer, Senior Member
Catchwords: APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL – no substantial miscarriage of justice – questions of fact – evidence at and conduct of hearing adequate for findings. APPEAL – no question of law identified – no question of law discernible.
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| Consumer and Commercial Division - Strata
Judgment of: F Marks ADCJ, Principal Member; S Thode, Senior Member
Catchwords: Appeal – Strata application – applicant did not formulate claim – Tribunal unable to deal with claim because of lack of evidence – leave to appeal declined, appeal dismissed.
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