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| | | NCAT Appeal Decisions Digest February 2018 Decisions
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| | The NCAT Appeal Decisions Digest provides monthly keyword summaries of decisions of the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NCAT) Internal Appeal Panel.
The following NCAT Appeal Panel decisions were handed down during February 2018. Each case title is hyperlinked to the full decision available on NSW Caselaw. |
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| Johnson v Dibbin; Gatsby v Gatsby [2018] NSWCATAP 45
Consumer and Commercial Division - Residential Tenancy
Decision of: Wright J, President; Boland ADCJ, Deputy President; Dr J Renwick SC, Senior Member
Background: There were two appeals in relation to separate proceedings under the Residential Tenancies Act 2010 (NSW). One appeal related to compensation orders and orders in relation to the rental bond. The other concerned termination and possession orders.
At the time each of the proceedings was commenced the parties were residents of different States. As a result, they were matters between residents of different States within s 75(iv) of the Constitution and, if judicial power was being exercised, involved the judicial power of the Commonwealth. Only a State body that is a “court of a State” can exercise federal judicial power.
The appeals were listed together in order to determine the separate questions of whether the Tribunal had authority to hear and determine the matters on the basis that:
a) The Tribunal was exercising executive and not judicial power when it determined matters under the RT Act; or
b) If not, the Tribunal was a “court of a State” for the purposes of Chapter III of
the Constitution and s 39 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth).
Held: i) the Tribunal can hear and determine matters under the Residential Tenancies Act, even if they are between residents of different States, and Burns v Corbett [2017] NSWCA 3 does not lay down a legal rule that requires a different result (at [1]).
(ii) The Tribunal exercises judicial power when performing functions under the
Residential Tenancies Act (at [203]),
TCL Air Conditioner (Zhongshan) Co Ltd v The Judges of the Federal Court of
Australia (2013) 251 CLR 533 at [27]; [2013] HCA 5 applied.
Dattilo v Commonwealth of Australia [2017] FCAFC 17 at [128] applied.
Groenvelt v Burwell (1700) 1 Salk 200, 91 ER 179 applied.
The Tribunal exercises judicial power on two bases. First, having regard to the principles concerning judicial power (at [49] – [62]), the general nature of the Tribunal (at [64] – [112]) and the functions performed by the Tribunal under the Residential Tenancies Act (at [113] – [144]), the Tribunal was exercising judicial power when it determined the two matters ([145] – [171]). This conclusion is supported by analogy and history (at [172] – [180]. Secondly, the Full Federal Court has held that a court performing the same functions as the Tribunal under the Residential Tenancies Act is exercising judicial power and NCAT can be seen to be a court of record as it has the power to imprison and fine (at [181] – [202]).
(iii) There is no binding authority that establishes that the Tribunal is not a “court of a
State” (at [33] and [205] – [219]),
Coleman v Power (2004) 220 CLR 1 at [79]; [2004] HCA 39 applied.
(iv) The Tribunal is a court of a State for the purposes of Ch III of the Constitution and s 39 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) (at [363]),
Condon v Pompano Pty Ltd (2013) 252 CLR 38 at [67]; [2013] HCA 7 applied.
Trust Company of Australia Limited v Skiwing Pty Ltd (2006) 66 NSWLR 77; [2006] NSWCA 185 distinguished.
Owen v Menzies [2013] 2 Qd R 327; [2012] QCA 170 followed.
The Tribunal satisfies the defining characteristics of a Ch III court (at [308]) in that:
(a) it has the reality and appearance of decisional independence and
impartiality (at [231] – [285]);
(b) it is required to apply procedural fairness (at [286] – [293]);
(c) it is required to adhere as a general rule to the open court principle (at
[294] – [296]);
(d) it is required to provide reasons for decisions (at [297] – [305]).
The Tribunal is predominantly composed of decision makers who have the decisional independence and impartiality so as to be able to be characterised as judges in substance, even if not called judges or magistrates (at [322]).
The features of a decision making body identified in Trust Company of Australia Limited v Skiwing Pty Ltd (2006) 66 NSWLR 77 at [26] and [27], considered and balanced in the Tribunal’s case, support the conclusion that the Tribunal is a court (at [347]).
The Tribunal can be seen as a court of record (at [201] and [350]).
The circumstances of NCAT and QCAT are relevantly indistinguishable (at [359]).
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| Taylor v Peslak [2018] NSWCATAP 57
Consumer and Commercial Division - Residential Tenancy
Decision of: M Harrowell, Principal Member; R Titterton, Principal Member
Background: A landlord sought to evict her tenant, who had occupied the premises for more than 31 years, under s 94 of the Residential Tenancies Act 2010 (NSW) (the RT Act). The landlord applied to the Tribunal, seeking orders for termination, vacant possession and payment of rent up to the date that vacant possession was given.
At first instance, the Tribunal dismissed the application and gave oral reasons. The landlord applied for written reasons, which were provided almost four months later. In her Notice of Appeal, the landlord sought an extension of time to file the appeal.
On appeal, there were three issues to be determined ([22]):
1) Is the appeal out of time and should the time to appeal be extended?
2) What is the proper construction of s 94 of the RT Act and scope of the
Tribunal’s discretion thereunder?
3) Should leave be granted because the Tribunal’s decision was against the weight of the evidence or not fair and equitable?
Held (dismissing the appeal): (i) Rule 25(4)(c) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014 requires that if a party is given oral reasons for decision, the time to appeal commences from the date those reasons are given ([45]).
There is a difference between the decision and the reasons (at [30] – [31]), and
“reasons” can be provided either orally or in writing ([37]):
[O]nce reasons are given, even if orally, the party seeking to appeal is informed of the reason why the decision was made and is able to discern what, if any, error has been made and commence appropriate appeal proceedings in consequence thereof.
However, if a party is not present or the decision or reasons are not given at the hearing, the time to appeal does not start to run until the reasons are received ([44]).
Escape Media Pty Ltd v Lawler [2018] NSWCATAP 17 not followed
In the present appeal, an extension of time to lodge the appeal was nonetheless granted ([54]), noting that the Tribunal was “substantially late” in providing written reasons ([50]) and the delay had not caused “substantial prejudice” to the tenant ([52]).
(ii) The discretion to make a termination order under s 94(1) of the RT Act only arises if the Tribunal is satisfied of three conditions: (a) the tenant has been in continual possession of the premises for 20 years or more, (b) the fixed term of the original agreement has expired, and (c) the Tribunal is satisfied that it is appropriate to do so in the circumstances ([55] – [57]).
In relation to (c), the circumstances of the tenant, as well as those of the landlord must be taken into account ([65] – [66]).
The Appeal Panel concluded that there is a two-step process in making such a termination order ([73]):
First, the Tribunal must be satisfied of the matters set out in s 94(1)(a)-(c). Secondly, if so satisfied, the Tribunal has a discretion as to whether or not a termination order should be made, and if so on what terms.
(iii) Leave to appeal refused.
In the absence of detailed financial evidence from the landlord and in circumstances where there was significant evidence provided by the tenant as to her circumstances and the need to continue to reside in the premises, the Appeal Panel was not satisfied that an error was made by the Tribunal in terms of the weight given to the
evidence of each of the parties. Nor could it be said that the decision was not fair and equitable in the circumstances of the case as presented to the Tribunal (at [95]).
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| Profitability Consulting Pty Ltd v Thorpe [2018] NSWCATAP 41
Consumer and Commercial Division - General
Decision of: A Britton, Principal Member
Background: En route to Sydney from their home on the NSW Victorian border to participate in an appeal hearing, the respondents received notice that the appellant had decided to withdraw the appeal.
The respondents sought a costs order for out-of-pocket expenses (child care, travel and accommodation expenses) incurred to attend the aborted hearing.
The central issue for determination was whether the expenses were recoverable under s 60 of the NCAT Act.
Held (refusing the application for costs): (i) the term “costs” under s 60 should be read narrowly as “legal costs”, for three reasons (at [14] – [19]):
[14] First, as observed by the majority in Cachia [v Hanes (1994) 179 CLR 403; [1994] HCA
14]] at [11], costs are awarded by way of partial indemnity for professional legal costs actually incurred in the conduct of litigation and were never intended to be comprehensive compensation for any loss suffered by a party in litigation such as the expenses of travel and loss of time.
[15] Second, interpreting the term costs to mean legal costs is consistent with the meaning of the term costs in s 60(4) of the NCAT Act … [see s 6 Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW)] …
…
[19] Finally, if the general approach to awards of costs in litigation were to be varied in NCAT from that which applies in courts, it is likely that this would be made plain in the NCAT Act.
(ii) A self-represented party can recover expenses that they would have been able to recover had they been represented (see Farquar & Farquar (No. 2) [2008] FamCA
682 at [8]) (at [20]; nonetheless, the respondents’ personal out-of-pocket expenses do not constitute disbursements, and are not recoverable under s 60 (at [22]).
“Disbursements” are described at [21] by reference to Dal Pont, Law of Costs, (LexisNexis Butterworth, 3rd ed, 2013) at 1.8, as:
… money paid on behalf of a client of a lawyer to a third party that can properly be included
in the bill of costs.
While the Appeal Panel acknowledged the result to be “unfortunate” and “in some sense unjust” ([23]), as none of the claimed expenses would have been recoverable as disbursements had the respondents been legally represented, it follows that an award for costs could not be made ([22]).
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| Atlantic Caravans Pty Ltd v Armstrong & Hinterland Outdoors Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCATAP 52
Consumer and Commercial Division - Motor Vehicle
Decision of: S Westgarth, Deputy President; D Robertson, Senior Member
Background: Mr Armstrong purchased a caravan, manufactured by Atlantic Caravans, from Hinterland Outdoors. The caravan was found to be faulty.
At first instance, the Tribunal found that defects in the caravan amounted to a major failure to comply with the consumer guarantee of acceptable quality in s 54 of the Australian Consumer Law (NSW) (ACL), which entitled Mr Armstrong to reject the caravan and recover a full refund and damages.
Atlantic appealed on the basis that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to determine the dispute (the “Burns v Corbett point” ([6])), and that it had committed errors of law by finding that there was a “major failure” and ultimately reaching an unfair decision.
Held (dismissing the appeal): (i) the Burns v Corbett point had no substance ([17]), as a corporation cannot be found to be a “resident” of a state for the purposes of s
75(iv) of the Constitution.
Australasian Temperance and General Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd v Howe (1922) 31 CLR 290 (the Australasian Temperance case), applied.
At [27] of the leading judgment in Burns v Corbett; Gaynor v Burns [2017] NSWCA 3; (2017) 343 ALR 690, Leeming JA referred to page 122 of his book Authority to Decide (2012, Federation Press). Here, his Honour referenced the Australasian Temperance case in stating that “only natural persons may be ‘residents’” ([24]).
It was also held that Johnson v Dibbin [2018] NSWCATAP 45 provides a further basis for rejecting the contention that the tribunal did not have jurisdiction. ([33])
(ii) No error of law in finding that there was a “major failure”.
Section 260 of the ACL (NSW) states that:
A failure to comply with a guarantee referred to in section 259(1)(b) that applies to a supply of goods is a major failure if:
(a) the goods would not have been acquired by a reasonable consumer fully acquainted with the nature and extent of the failure; …
In accordance with s 260, the Tribunal’s conclusion that the failure to comply with the consumer guarantee of acceptable quality was a “major failure” was based on the evidence before it, including evidence that Mr Armstrong would not have purchased the caravan had he known of its condition ([34] – [36]).
(iii) The effect of the Tribunal’s order was not to hinder or adversely affect any rights or obligations between Atlantic and Hinterland ([44]). Accordingly, Atlantic suffered no unfairness ([44]).
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| Bott v NSW Land and Housing Corporation (No 2) [2018] NSWCATCD 2*
Consumer and Commercial Division - Social Housing
Decision of: The Hon F Marks, Principal Member
*Although not an Appeal Panel decision, this decision is important because it deals with the Tribunal’s power, under s 73 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NCAT Act), to refer matters involving contempt to the Supreme Court.
Background: A social housing tenant brought a series of proceedings against the NSW Land and Housing Corporation (LAHC), seeking rectification of defects and compensation. In 2016, the tenant obtained a number of orders against LAHC.
After LAHC failed to comply with the orders, the tenant successfully applied, pursuant to s 73 of the NCAT Act, to refer the matters to the Supreme Court on the question of whether LAHC was guilty of contempt of the Tribunal.Section 73(3) and (5) relevantly provide that:
(3) … the Tribunal may vacate or revoke an order with respect to contempt of the Tribunal.
(5) Without limiting the powers of the Tribunal under this section, if it is alleged, or appears
to the Tribunal on its own view, that a person is guilty of contempt of the Tribunal (whether committed in the face or hearing of the Tribunal or not), the Tribunal may refer the matter to the Supreme Court for determination.
Subsequently, the Secretary of the Department of Family and Community Services, who is responsible for the administration of LAHC, wrote to the Tribunal to apologise for the non-compliance with the Tribunal’s orders and to outline the steps LAHC was taking to comply with the orders and improve its procedures. LAHC also adduced an expert report confirming that all of the work the subject of the Tribunal orders had been attended to satisfactorily ([8] – [11]).
Held (vacating the referral order): (i) the Tribunal has a discretion created by section 73(3) whether to vacate or revoke the referral order ([19]). (ii) The exercise of discretion requires the balancing of a number of competing considerations (at [24]): A convenient starting point is a consideration of the utility of the referral power created by section 73 of the Act. As I previously indicated, there are two principal matters for consideration. The first is the part that contempt plays in the enforcement procedures of this Tribunal. The second is the need to uphold and advance the integrity of the system of justice in New South Wales, which obviously includes the work of this Tribunal.The Tribunal noted that contempt procedures can play an important part in enforcing the Tribunal’s orders ([26]). However, as LAHC has apologised, rectified the problems and made undertakings to prevent further issues ([28]):[T]he question of enforcement of outstanding matters is no longer relevant, and as such the justification for a referral to the Supreme Court on this basis is lessened.On the question of upholding the administration of justice, the Tribunal noted that there were “powerful reasons for declining to revoke or vacate the earlier referral order” ([32]) given that LAHC is one of the largest institutional landlords in Australia and there could be benefits for its residents if a finding of contempt were made ([31]).
Nonetheless, it was necessary to balance all of the relevant matters ([33]), and on balance the Tribunal found that “given the changed circumstances … there is no longer any pressing reason to refer the matter to the Supreme Court.” ([34])
As a postscript, the Tribunal noted the following about the value of legal practitioners in proceedings before the Tribunal (at [35]):Without the assistance of legal practitioners who are prepared to give of their time pro bono in order to help individual litigants, and just as importantly, to facilitate the work of this Tribunal and the courts generally in the administration of justice, the ability of the courts and tribunals to serve the people of New South Wales would be diminished. |
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| | | Shpak v Sarakiniotis [2018] NSWCATAP 36
Consumer and Commercial Division - Residential Tenancy
Decision of: M Harrowell, Principal Member; J Currie, Senior Member Catchwords: RESIDENTIAL TENANCIES ACT - order to carry out work, power to make conditional orders and ancillary orders, access to premises. ADEQUACY OF REASONS - compensation and rent reduction claims, no findings of fact. REMEDIES - discretion to award, entitlement where breach and loss established. |
| Triston Pty Limited v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2018] NSWCATAP 37
Administrative and Equal Opportunity Division
Decision of: M D Schyvens, Deputy President; J S Currie, Senior Member Catchwords: REVENUE LAW – Land Tax – Land Tax Management Act 1956 (NSW), s 10AA – exemption for land used for primary production – meaning of “rural land” in s 10AA(4). STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) – application of s 33 – construction that would promote the purpose or object underlying the Act. |
| Kitoko v Sydney Local Health District [2018] NSWCATAP 38
Administrative and Equal Opportunity Division
Decision of: K Rosser, Principal Member; S Frost, Senior MemberCatchwords: APPEAL – summary dismissal – extension of time – leave to appeal |
| Douglas v Taylor & Whitty Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCATAP 39
Consumer and Commercial Division - General
Decision of: R Titterton, Principal Member; R Perrignon, Senior Member Catchwords: APPEALS – appeal against order dismissing application – where claim misconceived and lacking in substance, justifying dismissal pursuant to s 55(1)(b) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act |
| Johnson v Wilson [2018] NSWCATAP 40
Consumer and Commercial Division - Residential Tenancy
Decision of: S Westgarth, Deputy President; Dr J Lucy, Senior MemberCatchwords: QUESTION OF LAW – no miscarriage of justice |
| Profitability Consulting Pty Ltd v Thorpe [2018] NSWCATAP 41
Consumer and Commercial Division - General
Decision of: A Britton, Principal MemberCatchwords: COSTS – Party/Party – Self represented party. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – Words and meaning – meaning of the term “costs” in s 60 of Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) |
| Foster v The Minister Administering the Environmental Planning & Assessment Act [2018] NSWCATAP 42
Consumer and Commercial Division - Residential Tenancy
Decision of: A P Coleman SC, Senior Member; L Wilson, Senior MemberCatchwords: APPEAL – Whether error of law in exercise of discretion |
| Durran t/a Canberra Sheds and Outdoor Storage v Bliss [2018] NSWCATAP 43
Consumer and Commercial Division - Home Building
Decision of: M Harrowell, Principal Member; T Simon, Senior MemberCatchwords: COSTS – Application withdrawn, special circumstances, no determination on the merits |
| ZFV & anor v ZFW & ors [2018] NSWCATAP 44
Guardianship Division
Decision of: A Britton, Principal Member; K Ransome, Senior Member; A Lowe, General MemberCatchwords: HUMAN RIGHTS – Tribunals, commissions and other authorities – Civil and Administrative Tribunal – procedural fairness – application of hearing rule. HUMAN RIGHTS – Legislation – application of failure to give parties notice of hearing as required by s 10 of Guardianship Act 1987 (NSW) |
| Johnson v Dibbin; Gatsby v Gatsby [2018] NSWCATAP 45
Consumer and Commercial Division - Residential Tenancy
Decision of: Wright J, President; Boland ADCJ, Deputy President; Dr J Renwick SC, Senior Member Catchwords: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – judicial power – whether Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NSW), NCAT, exercises judicial power – whether NCAT exercises judicial power when determining matters under the Residential Tenancies Act 2010 (NSW) – NCAT exercises judicial power. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – Chapter III courts – defining characteristics of Chapter III courts – whether Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NSW), NCAT, a “court of a State” within Chapter III – NCAT is a court of a State for the purposes of Chapter III. COURTS AND TRIBUNALS – Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NSW), NCAT – jurisdiction of NCAT – whether Tribunal has authority to adjudicate in matters under the Residential Tenancies Act 2010 (NSW) between residents of different states – NCAT has authority to adjudicate. COURTS AND TRIBUNALS – courts of record – Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NSW), NCAT – whether NCAT a court of record – NCAT a court of record |
| The Owners - Strata Plan No. 47027 v Peter Clisdell Pty Ltd (No. 2) [2018] NSWCATAP 46
Consumer and Commercial Division - Strata
Decision of: M Harrowell, Principal Member; G K Burton SC, Senior Member Catchwords: COSTS – special circumstances, proceedings dismissed as incompetent, cost claimed where no legal representation at hearing, exercise of discretion where substantive issues raised on appeal not resolved |
| WaxHed Incorporated Pty Ltd v Empire Real Estate Australia Ltd [2018] NSWCATAP 47
Consumer and Commercial Division - Motor Vehicle
Decision of: The Hon F Marks, Principal Member; S Thode, Senior MemberCatchwords: APPEAL – consumer claim – Australian Consumer Law (NSW) – whether major failure of breach of consumer guarantee- remedies for breach of consumer guarantees – excessive consumption of oil-vehicle repaired – Tribunal failed to give reasons – appeal upheld – matter determined in lieu of remittal – orders made |
| Kaci v Birch [2018] NSWCATAP 48
Consumer and Commercial Division - Residential Tenancy
Decision of: L P Robberds QC, Senior Member; L Wilson, Senior MemberCatchwords: RESIDENTIAL TENANCY – premises modified without Council consent – monetary claim by tenant based on lack of Council consent – tenant seeks to rely on submissions as evidence – rejected by Tribunal member – extension of time sought by tenant to appeal – principles applicable – leave to appeal – principles applicable – whether tenant suffered loss or damage |
| Ramsey v NSW Land and Housing Corporation [2018] NSWCATAP 49
Consumer and Commercial Division - Social Housing
Decision of: K O’Connor, AM, ADCJ, Deputy President, Appeals; L Pearson, Principal MemberCatchwords: APPEAL – Residential tenancies – termination order – rent arrears – refusal of adjournment - whether errors of law – whether leave to appeal should be granted |
| Eager v North Sydney Retirement Trust [2018] NSWCATAP 50
Consumer and Commercial Division - Retirement Villages
Decision of: P Durack SC, Senior Member; A Boxall, Senior memberCatchwords: APPEAL – summary dismissal – leave to appeal - provision of audited accounts and proposed annual budgets complying with the Retirement Villages Act 1999 – new evidence |
| Conway v Brady [2018] NSWCATAP 51
Consumer and Commercial Division - Residential Tenancy
Decision of: Roger Hamilton SC, Senior Member; T Simon, Senior Member Catchwords: RESIDENTIAL TENANCY – adjournment – procedural fairness – error of law – conduct of a hearing |
| Atlantic Caravans Pty Ltd v Armstrong & Hinterland Outdoors Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCATAP 52
Consumer and Commercial Division - Motor VehicleDecision of: S Westgarth, Deputy President; D Robertson, Senior Member Catchwords: JURISDICTION – diversity jurisdiction of the Commonwealth – major defect, major failure under the Australian Consumer Law |
| Tallevine Pty Ltd t/as Pennant Hills Isuzu v Levoune [2018] NSWCATAP 53
Consumer and Commercial Division - Motor Vehicle
Decision of: M Harrowell, Principal Member; J McAteer, Senior MemberCatchwords: LEAVE TO APPEAL – no issue of principle – no substantial miscarriage of justice |
| Champion Homes Pty Ltd v Guirgis [2018] NSWCATAP 54
Consumer and Commercial Division - Home Building
Decision of: M Harrowell, Principal Member; R Titterton, Principal MemberCatchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Interlocutory decision – leave to appeal – relevance of cl 12 of Sch 4 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 – need to show substantial miscarriage of justice – applicable principles to grant of leave. SUMMONS – application to set aside – applicable principles – need to identify issues in dispute – apparent relevance – “throw light on” issues in dispute – unduly onerous – oppressive. COSTS – general discretion – partial success in application |
| ZGV v ZGT [2018] NSWCATAP 55
Guardianship Division
Decision of: K O’Connor AM, ADCJ, Deputy President, Appeals; J McAteer, Senior Member; J Koussa, General MemberCatchwords: GUARDIANSHIP – Person in need of guardian – In full time care – Carer applies to be appointed guardian – Tribunal refuses as not satisfied an appointment should be made – Whether failed to take into account relevant matters – Whether decision manifestly unreasonable – Whether reasons adequate – Section 14(2) discretion flexible – Though Tribunal initially misdescribed the nature of its task, it did have regard to the considerations mandated by s 14(2) and did perform the task required by s 14(2) – No failure to take account of relevant matters – decision not unreasonable – reasons adequate – Appeal dismissed. Guardianship Act 1987, s14(2), s 4 |
| Komadina trading as We Paint Pools v Kelleher [2018] NSWCATAP 56
Consumer and Commercial Division - Home Building
Decision of: L Pearson, Principal Member; J Kearney, Senior Member Catchwords: COSTS – Whether special circumstances |
| Taylor v Peslak [2018] NSWCATAP 57
Consumer and Commercial Division - Residential Tenancy
Decision of: M Harrowell, Principal Member; R Titterton, Principal MemberCatchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – time to appeal – commencement of period. RESIDENTIAL TENANCIES ACT – termination of long term tenancies – preconditions to making a termination order. LEAVE TO APPEAL – substantial miscarriage of justice – against the weight of evidence – not fair and equitable – sufficiency of evidence.
WORDS AND PHRASES – meaning of “given reasons of decision” in r 25(4)(b) of
the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014. WORDS AND PHRASES – meaning of “the circumstances of the case” in s 84 of the Residential Tenancies Act 2010 |
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